Thursday, May 1, 2025
Home Blog Page 3

Public Participation: A key element of any public private partnership in Kenya

How are public private partnerships (PPPs) supposed to be entered into? That was the central question that a section of the Kenyan public asked when it emerged last year that the Government had entered into a PPP with Adani Airports Holdings Limited, a subsidiary of the Adani Group, to lease Jomo Kenyatta International Airport for thirty (30) years (the JKIA Deal).

The JKIA Deal was marred by allegations of corruption and bribery, shrouded in secrecy and hurriedly executed. It was also alleged that it violated a number of laws which should guide how PPPs are entered into in Kenya.

While the matter was not determined by the courts on its legality, on 21 November 2024, President Ruto announced that he was cancelling the JKIA Deal, following the indictment in New York of Gautam Adani and his fellow executives in connection with alleged schemes to pay hundreds of millions of dollars in bribes. At the same time, the Government – through the Kenya Electricity Transmission Company (Ketraco) – announced the signing of a power PPP project allowing Adani Energy Solutions, another subsidiary of the Adani Group, to develop and operate transmission lines for thirty (30) years.

Questions have been raised with respect to how this PPP was entered into and, as court proceedings are currently ongoing, it may very well be (as you will see below) that a quashing order is imminent.

Article 227 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 (the Constitution) provides that when a state organ or any other public entity contracts for goods or services, it shall do so in accordance with a system that is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost- effective.

Additionally, Article 201 of the Constitution provides that in this process, there shall be openness and accountability, including public participation in financial matters. This requirement is to be read together with Article 10 of the Constitution, which provides that whenever implementing public policy decisions, the Government is bound by the national values and principles, including participation of the people, transparency and accountability.

PPPs under the PPP Act relate to the financing, construction, development, operation or maintenance of infrastructure or development projects.

There are different procurement methods allowed under the PPP Act, including direct procurement, privately initiated proposals (PIPs), competitive bidding, and restricted bidding. Further, the PPP Act mandates certain prequalification procedures mandatory for a contracting authority (defined as any state organ, at any level, intending to have its functions undertaken by a private entity), which include ascertaining the expertise, financial capacity, experience and due diligence checks of the private party before entering into a PPP.

Importantly, direct procurement is only allowed where the private party possesses intellectual property rights to the key approaches to the PPP, and where no reasonable alternative is available, among other reasons. Irrespective, direct procurement requires adherence to certain PPP Act procedures, including issuing a tender document and appointing an evaluation committee.

For PIPs, the PPP Act mandates that they must be subjected to due diligence to confirm that the private party is not corrupt, is not barred from PPPs in any other country, and is solvent. Additionally, PIPs are evaluated under the following four (4) criteria: public interest, project feasibility, the PPP suitability, and affordability. Under the public interest criteria, the views of the public may be sought through public participation.

Competitive bidding, another form of PPP, is more commonplace as it involves an invitation by the contracting authority of tenders, while restricted bidding is only undertaken where the following conditions have been met:

i. where, because of the complex or specialised nature of the work, contracting is restricted to prequalified tenderers;

ii. where the time to consider tenders would be disproportionate to the services;

iii. where there are few known suppliers of the services; and

iv. where an advertisement is placed on the contracting authority’s website regarding the decision to procure in this manner.

Cutting across all these procurement methods is the requirement to ensure that public participation is undertaken on a project. In Erick Okeyo -v- County Government of Kisumu & 2 Others, Petition No.1 “A” of 2014, the High Court – in considering the issue of public participation in tendering process vis PPPs – determined that the Constitution provides for citizen participation in policy formulation, planning and development; effective resources mobilisation and use for sustainable development; project identification, prioritisation, planning and implementation. Consequently, it determined that any policy decision by way of a PPP in which the citizens are not engaged in a meaningful way is constitutionally and legally indefensible.

While interpreting what amounts to effective public participation, the High Court in Robert N. Gakuru & Others v Governor Kiambu County & 3 others [2014] determined that public participation must be real and not illusory. To this end, it was held that for effective public participation to be said to have been undertaken, measures must be taken to facilitate the said public engagement over and above mere publication in government notices or media sites. Consequently, in PPPs, it is expected that the contracting authority must facilitate public engagement on the project over and above the ordinary notices in government gazettes. With respect to the JKIA Deal, this was not undertaken.

As rightly identified by the African Development Bank in its PPP Strategic Framework 2021 – 2031, there are huge infrastructure gaps in African countries, especially in transport, electricity and water supply, which act as impediments to their economic growth. These gaps necessitated investment financing by the private sector to the tune of US$108 billion up until 2025. PPPs can offer a solution to increase investments and efficiencies in public infrastructure while ensuring meaningful returns, financially and socially, for impact investors on the continent.

However, lessons from Kenya show that effective public participation must be undertaken before any PPPs are considered and, therefore, contracting parties must find a way to work around confidentiality requirements in PPP agreements and input conditions precedent requiring the satisfactory completion of effective public participation that pass the muster of constitutional criticism.

Kevin Kipchirchir is an Associate and Njeri Wagacha is a Director | CDH Kenya

GHOST BITES (Quantum Foods | MultiChoice – Santam – Sanlam)

A Quantum leap in earnings (JSE: QFH)

Earnings at the poultry group are much higher than before

In February, Quantum Foods released a voluntary update dealing with the four months to January. It painted a really positive picture, as there were no HPAI (avian flu) outbreaks and there’s been practically zero load shedding. To add to the happier times in the poultry sector, egg selling prices were up.

With so much positivity around the rebuilding of the layer flock and the increase in egg supply, investors were hoping that the strong start to the year would continue. The insert-unavoidable-eggcellent-pun-here news is that this appears to be the case, with HEPS for the six months to March 2024 up by a rather daft 213%.

Percentage moves don’t make much sense once you head above 100%, so it’s better to note that the increase is from 21.7 cents to 68.0 cents.

The operational update was far more detailed than the trading statement, with the company simply noting that the conditions highlighted in the operational update continued for the remaining two months of the interim period.


Santam has concluded the deal for the short-term part of MultiChoice’s insurance business, NMS Insurance Services (JSE: SNT)

You may recall that Sanlam initiated the deal

In the middle of 2024, Sanlam announced that it would be acquiring 60% in MultiChoice’s insurance business (NMS Insurance Services). At the time, the deal was structured with a R1.2 billion upfront payment and R1.5 billion in potential earn-outs. Given the challenges being faced by MultiChoice, this was a very welcome injection of cash.

NMS includes both life insurance and general insurance products. Cleverly, the share class structure was set up in such a way that there are separate classes of shares. This allowed Sanlam to initiate the transaction, before bringing Santam along to buy the general insurance side of the business.

Santam picked up the relevant shares for R925 million and at the time that deal was announced, it was made clear that the prospects for an earn-out on this book are limited. Sanlam therefore ended up with an initial net outflow of R275 million, plus a large potential earn-out.

None of this is new information. The only new part is that Santam and Sanlam have now implemented the deal, which means that they are both on the register alongside MultiChoice.


Nibbles:

  • Director dealings:
    • The results of the Lighthouse Properties (JSE: LTE) scrip dividend are in! Unsurprisingly, Des de Beer picked up a vast number of shares in the process, with a scrip dividend worth R31 million. There were three other directors who picked up shares in this way, albeit to a much lower extent with an aggregate value of R2.4 million.
    • A non-executive director of BHP Group (JSE: BHG) bought shares worth R517k.
    • The spouse of an executive director of Brimstone (JSE: BRT) bought shares worth R240k.
  • Super Group (JSE: SPG) announced that the Supreme Court of New South Wales has approved the scheme of arrangement related to the deal for SG Fleet. This is the last major step before the scheme becomes effective, with a planned implementation date of 30 April. Goodness knows that Super Group needed this one, given the challenges elsewhere in the group.
  • SA Corporate Real Estate (JSE: SAC) released an announcement that Cervantes Investments (Pty) Ltd now holds 12.86% in the company. That sounds very much like the percent now held by Castleview Property Fund (JSE: CVW) based on their announcement, so I’m pretty sure Cervantes is part of Castleview.

Ghost Stories #60: Debt markets – the other side of the coin

Listen to the show using this podcast player:

Intengo Market is a revolutionary independent digital marketplace for debt instruments in South Africa. Incubated by RMB in 2020 and having launched as a standalone business in 2024, the platform is growing to improve the market for all participants through outcomes like increased liquidity and price discovery. You can look forward to receiving insights into the debt market in South Africa from Intengo in months to come.

In this podcast, we covered topics like:

  • Why is the debt market so important?
  • For what reason would a company or state-owned enterprise go the route of public debt markets?
  • What are the trends in public vs. private debt markets?
  • How does Intengo play a role in price discovery, debt raising strategies and the associated processes?
  • What role do ratings agencies play in this ecosystem?

If you’re ready to learn about debt markets, you’re in the right place.

Debt arrangers, advisors, treasurers, CFOs and debt investors who want to learn more about Intengo Market can visit the website here.

Full transcript:

Intengo Market is a revolutionary independent digital marketplace for debt instruments in South Africa. Incubated by RMB in 2020 and having launched as a standalone business in 2024, the platform is growing to improve the market for all participants through outcomes like increased liquidity and price discovery. You can look forward to receiving insights into the debt market in South Africa from Intengo in months to come.

The Finance Ghost: Welcome to this episode of the Ghost Stories podcast, coming to you in a week that has been absolutely bonkers in equity markets. I’m actually quite excited to be talking about a completely different point on the capital stack. We are not talking about equity today; we are talking about debt.

It’s going to be super interesting. We’ve got Ian Norden on the call. He is the founder and CEO of Intengo Market and if you look on their website, they call themselves a corporate debt marketplace using a digital platform to revolutionise how corporate debt instruments are issued and traded in South Africa. Very nice, Ian. Luckily we are going to spend the next half an hour or so explaining what that actually is and how debt works in South Africa, because this is a side of the public markets that I think most investors have had very little exposure to and they don’t really see it unless they read every SENS announcement – or Ghost Bites for that matter – and they see stories about companies raising debt, etc.

But if you haven’t seen any of that, then I think there’s going to be a lot of new stuff for you on this podcast – and if you are listening to this as someone who is already in the debt space, then I think Ian’s insights are going to be fantastic. So, Ian, thank you for joining this podcast and for doing this with me. It’s going to be a fun one.

Ian Norden: Hi Ghost. Yes, I’m looking forward to it. Thanks for having me here.

The Finance Ghost: Look, I see you’ve got your fintech startup golf shirt and you’ve got your very cool coffee shop noise-cancelling headphones, which means that the business must be doing very well! This is the surefire sign – if you were dressed up in a fancy shirt and you didn’t have the headphones, because you only work in an office and not in a coffee shop, I’d be quite worried about the future of this business. I’d be very worried that you might be out there just focusing on, I don’t know, LinkedIn webinars as opposed to actually doing successful things.

Ian Norden: Yeah, I think the biggest shift in moving from banking to fintech is the wardrobe change.

The Finance Ghost: There we go.

Ian Norden: You have to live your brand.

The Finance Ghost: 100%, there it is. So, we’re going to talk about the brand, but I think before we do that, we’re definitely going to talk about just the overarching picture here, the umbrella story, which that most people listening to this podcast are I’m sure very familiar with – the equity side of the JSE and of other exchanges worldwide for that matter. That’s been in all the headlines this week really, is what’s happening in equity markets. And this is where you’ll find the shares that you know and you love and a few that might have hurt you, especially in the last couple of weeks. Really, it’s been a bit wild!

But the market also has this vibrant debt side where companies go and obtain funding from public markets in the form of debt. They do stuff like domestic medium term note programmes and you also have state owned enterprises that raise debt through much the same way.

Just how big and important is this side of the market, Ian? This somewhat hidden side that a lot of retail investors don’t actually know much about?

Ian Norden: Ghost, that’s a great intro to it. I think as you said, is probably not as public in terms of the retail side, but from an importance perspective, certainly a very important part of the capital structure of most companies. And then if you look at, just globally, look at governments, look at the debt issues the US are having for example, and South Africa’s got a lot of debt so certainly debt’s not going away and companies are no different.

We can talk a little bit more about how they’re raising debt and maybe some of the shifts we’re seeing in the market. But as a tool, I think it’s been around for a long time and it’s not going anywhere.

The Finance Ghost: What sort of numbers are we talking here? I mean this is billions and billions and billions and billions and billions, right? To quote the man who’s currently making the world a bit of a crazy place, it’s many, many billions of rands that are happening out there when you see these note programmes and all these debt issuances, right?

Ian Norden: Yeah. So a note programme – maybe to jump ahead – when you register a note programme with one of the exchanges, you do have to set a limit and it’s hopefully a limit you don’t hit. But generally these limits are in the R5 to R10 billion range per corporate. These aren’t banks who would have much bigger – I think R100 billion could be some of the bank limits. To put it into perspective, we’re probably servicing through our platform about 30% of the market in terms of new corporate and non-government issues. We’ve seen about R160 billion of debt come through in the last three years. So if you proxy that out, you could probably say the market is roughly about that per annum – R150, R160 billion of debt. And again, that’s just in the listed space. Something we need to talk to as well as the difference between private and public debt, because there’s certainly been a big shift in that space too.

The Finance Ghost: Yeah, absolutely. I remember in the early days of Ghost Mail I wrote – back when it was weekly – I wrote this piece about how the debt:equity ratio for a business is a bit like when you go to the beach and you’re getting a soft serve and then you pick two of the flavours and you got to get the mix just right, otherwise you have a problem. And if you put too much ice cream on top of the cone and it can’t support it, then you have an even bigger problem. I think that analogy still rings true today.

Companies, treasurers, CFOs – they’re constantly trying to just optimise the way they have funded their business. And when people refer to the capital stack, they’re talking to all the different ways that you can fund a company. Obviously you’ve got equity at one extreme, which is the most expensive way to do it. People who have studied finance will understand that. But for those who haven’t, it’s not to say that oh, it has the highest interest rate – equity doesn’t have an interest rate! It pays dividends and it’s not forced to pay dividends. So what does it mean to say the cost is higher there than in debt?

The reason is that an equity investor expects a higher return than a debt investor. There’s dilution of your existing shareholders when you go and issue equities. A lot of JSE listed companies trade at a discount to their net asset value in many cases. They go and they issue equity and it turns out to be quite an expensive way to raise funding.

So then, what are their options? And this is when you start to move down the capital stack effectively and you find stuff like mezzanine finance. You don’t see that too often in the public space. To your point, that’s more like private markets, a private equity kind of thing. But what you do see is a lot of companies raising debt through these programmes and then raising from banks, for example. Stuff like term loans, revolving credit facilities, similar sort of structures. Why do these two different things exist? Why is there a public debt market as opposed to just going and knocking on the door of your local bank and saying, hey, we need a few billion in debt?

Ian Norden: That’s a great question because as you said, there are immediate cost benefits of raising debt. I think if we park the – one of the overarching common traits of debt is that it is tax deductible, we’ll park that as a common feature and look at interest in the debt space.

What are your options? Maybe it’s useful to talk about the evolution of a corporate’s journey. So you might start out, as you’ve said, with some equity. You might raise that from friends and family or angel investors. You might then IPO if you grow to scale or raise more money through different private equity models. But when you get to debt, you generally start your journey with a relationship bank. And that bank will lend you money from time to time with a business loan. As you grow, that might become a revolving credit facility as you say, which is really a facility similar to a listed programme where you can draw down on it from time to time.

Then, you might have a GBF or bank guaranteed facility, where it’s essentially the same but just for longer-term debt. And then you might get to a point where the bank says, hang on, I actually can’t lend you any more money because from a credit line perspective I’ve hit my limit. So then what you do is in South Africa specifically – we have four or five very large banks relative to others and relative to other markets – what you might do is then go to those other banks and essentially wash, rinse, repeat, do the same thing.

And then as you continue to grow, and let’s use real estate investment trusts as a good example, they also need lots of debt to buy lots of properties and they are probably the most active in the listed space. Those entities would say right now what I need is I need more debt, and I need it from different sources because I’ve hit my limits with the banks. Then it gets interesting, because now there’s a cost to this. The next stage might be to say, well, I’m doing a specific project, so I’m going to go raise project finance from maybe a life insurance origination team who has an interest in a property deal that’s very long-term because they want to match their long-term retirement liabilities that they’ve got to their clients. You could look at project finance or project bonds or structured bonds. Those obviously need expertise. You have to pay someone to help you do that.

But if you can get to a point where your business doesn’t need structured debt, it can just raise money off the strength of its balance sheet. Then a listed programme becomes quite attractive because you’re immediately going to diversify across a range of different investors.

And this is public – we can talk to who actually can and does buy debt on the market. It becomes a public offering of sorts. You can tap asset managers, you can tap life insurers, you can tap high-net worth individuals if you want. What’s nice about these is they all have different hurdle rates. Where a bank would have a cost of capital, often set by regulation – Basel 3 or Basel 2 or whatever the current Basel is – that will almost set a floor for how low a bank can lend you money, regardless of how strong your credit worthiness is, where an asset manager doesn’t have that or a life insurer will have different regulation. You can start tapping into those nuances of the market and hopefully when you add an element of competitiveness to the process, you can bring down your cost of funding.

So in theory, you get low interest rates, not always the case, but you certainly get greater flexibility and diversification. You can also raise longer-term debt. As I mentioned, some of the players might be more interested in longer-term debt than shorter-term debt.

Generally to help you through this journey, you’d bring an arranger on board, which is traditionally the – some of the big banks do that, but there are smaller houses that will help you – because you need someone to guide you through this process and understand what it is you’re trying to do.

Maybe as an aside, one of the best benefits of debt versus equity is you’re not diluting ownership. Coming to public markets, you actually do have companies that would have just have listed debt and not have listed equity, because the reasons they’re looking for is maybe they don’t need capital from a fundraising perspective in that sense, and they don’t want to elude ownership, but they do need debt diversification. It’s a very interesting area and I think very different to the way equity operates.

The Finance Ghost: Yeah, it’s interesting. You referenced earlier that the property funds are so active in the space and that’s because of the way these REIT structures work where they basically need to continuously be distributing their profits at the end of the day. This is very different to a company that say, hangs onto its profits. We did Berkshire Hathaway recently in Magic Markets Premium, and that’s just a fascinating example because they’ve paid one dividend ever. That’s Warren Buffett’s famous company, one ever. The rest is all reinvested in the group.

There’s lots of debt. They use debt, obviously they use a variety of notes, etc. but I don’t think you’re going to see Berkshire Hathaway doing any capital raises on the equity side anytime soon because they can hang onto all of their dividends and they can reinvest it accordingly. Some companies are not in that boat. The property sector, as I’ve mentioned, right up there, so you’ll often see the REITs doing a combination of equity raises and then debt raises.

What is actually quite interesting is the equity raises in their business are inevitably for expansion. It’s like, hey, we want to go buy new properties, hence we need to go and raise equity. And then they will still need to raise debt in that example because they’ll always make sure they’re doing a debt:equity split that gets the property returns up. But even if they don’t go and buy new properties, they need to keep rolling their debt. They need to go and raise new debt as old debt comes off the books, effectively.

It’s quite a vibrant market because debt capital is not forever. Yes, it can be quite long-term and you’ve talked about how investors like pension funds or insurers are looking to match liabilities. That’s all very interesting and it’s absolutely right. But it can’t be forever. Debt cannot be infinite. So it just keeps rolling, and this leads to this very, very vibrant market where there’s always activity and in some cases perhaps more vibrant than equities.

So, do we see the same sort of trend on the debt markets that we see on the equity side? We’re always talking about delistings on the JSE. The London Stock Exchange has got almost exactly the same problem as the JSE, it’s actually really interesting. People think it’s only the JSE – it’s not! London is cut and paste effectively.

On the debt side, is it a similar issue, or is it actually growing? Is it just getting bigger and better all the time?

Ian Norden: I think on the listed side, it’s the same. You have to look at, and this is where I touched on earlier, private credit and public debt and what the market will call private credit is essentially debt from the borrower’s perspective. So what we have is we’ve got certain industries like you’ve mentioned, like the REITs, who have a continuous need and there’s structural efficiency in setting up a REIT to raise debt in that way. But then you’ve got other companies who are saying, I can raise private credit from a lot of these same players now, and I can achieve a lot of the same goals with a fraction of the operational and regulatory costs.

If we pull back to some of the systemic trends in the market, there have been over the last few years, a couple of incidents, let’s say, that have triggered some outcry from some of the larger investors, institutional investors, saying there’s not enough governance in the debt space. And so, for example, to be a director of a company that issues debt had a different standard to be a director of a company who has public debt and public equity.

The question would be why?

And so if you’re not getting the governance protection of listed debt as a lender, and you’re not getting a lot of the benefits from a lender’s perspective, this is on a regulated exchange and the exchange has almost a duty of care to make sure that the assets is coming from a reputable place. When those start breaking down and we’ve had one or two incidents, which I won’t go into, then people start questioning, well, is this worth it?

So what a lot of the asset managers and institutions do is they will have origination teams in-house and they will start looking for private deals which would normally only fall to a bank. Now you go back to the reasons for setting up a listed programme and you say, well, I was previously setting this up because I wanted to access these people, but now they’re phoning me anyway. That’s happening globally. I think if you then add technology onto that and you say, well, private debt is traditionally opaque, hard to find, you can now set up a bulletin board or think of Facebook marketplace for debt instruments and you can post this and people can see these deals now.

Again, there might be some hurdles you have to overcome to get the deal from person A to person B, but with technology and even things like the Electronic Communications Act, allowing for the electronic signing of things on a computer screen, those barriers are breaking down.

There are myriad other reasons. It’s an incredibly fascinating space at the moment. But there is a global shift from public to private and that’s certainly something that I think is not going to change. But in saying that, locally we have seen, I’d say post-Covid, we have seen a steady uptick in certainly the number of issuers. I think in the corporate space we’re seeing the usual suspects come to market. There’s an element of loyalty as well that the issuers will give to their lenders to say, look, I’m going to be something you can invest in continuously that drives some of the repeat business.

Obviously people aren’t going to borrow money for the sake of it. But certainly in the public space, you also want to make sure that when you do need money, you’re not coming to market and they go, who are you again? You know, what’s your credit story? We haven’t seen you for three, four years!

Capitec is actually a very good example in that space because they generally don’t need a lot of cash on their balance sheet. They’re very cash positive business in terms of the way they’re structured as a bank and their clients. But they come to market once a year to make sure that if they ever do need cash from the public market through their debt programme, there’s been a recent auction which is a recent price anchor and there’s familiarity with the lending base. As you’re gathering from this, many reasons to be in the public space. Individually, certain companies will probably always be in the public space, but systematically, they’re shifting.

The Finance Ghost: Super interesting, right? Because it’s quite a challenge for the banks in that they’ve now got these insurance companies coming and trying to eat their lunch on the debt market – ultimately private debt market that is – and well, in some respects public. But it sounds like traditionally, by the time a company gets to the public markets, it’s typically because banks have kind of tapped out, whereas this is something different. This is to say, hey, instead of going to a big bank, why don’t you raise from some kind of asset manager, for example, or pension fund or insurance house?

It’s interesting because banks should have such a low cost of capital because they’re raising deposits, they’re paying very little on things like current accounts, etc. But they obviously have a blended cost of funding across all kinds of things, including their own wholesale debt. And the insurance houses, I guess are looking at this and saying, well, we’re quite happy actually for our policyholders etc. to go and get these kind of returns over time. So you create this beautiful free market that we all know and love, where what will happen is what will happen over time.

I’m interested in how Intengo fits into this ecosystem then. Are you only focused on the public debt side? Are you focused a little bit on the private debt side as well? How does Intengo actually fit into this rather exciting world?

Ian Norden: Yeah, thanks for asking that. We’re obviously excited about what we’re doing, so it’s always great to talk about that. At our core, we are helping grease the wheels. So we are helping – a bank team, for example, would take a large issuer through a journey of raising debt. And that process, if you think of it almost as like mini-IPOs every time, but you generally don’t IPO once every three months. But some corporates might raise debt once every three months, so there needs to be a workflow system that that makes that process as seamless as possible and as cost effective as possible. So, preserve the integrity of the process, minimize risks and decrease costs.

To talk through the process, if you are bringing a new company to market, whether it’s a repeat of their programme – let’s maybe go back to bringing a new company. You need to set up a program. You bring some lawyers in, you have a sponsor, you go to one of the exchanges, most of them do debt now, and you then set up a programme for your client. That client then wants to raise money. Where Intengo can help is we can do things like saying these are particularly good days of the year to raise money. If we think about the investor universe, these lenders, if they are asset managers, a lot of their liquidity is coming from their existing instruments, the existing holdings. So we can say to the market through our analytics tools, we can say to the bank and to the corporate, this is a good day because this is a day when a government bond, for example, is paying a coupon and many investors are going to have cash that day.

We want to increase your chances of success. We want to increase competition. And increased competition should mean tighter pricing and a lower cost of funding. So that’s one side where we use some of our analytics tools.

But again, it’s an add on to the workflow because the workflow is then right, I want to create an auction. Our tool is an easy-to-use wizard where you can set parameters. This is the data I want. Whether you use our help or not, this is the structure I want. Do I want three-year or five-year? We’ve got many years of data at a very granular level. We can tell you what the market’s currently in favour of. Are they in favour of seven-year, five-year, three-year? If you are indifferent, you can at least have the best, most informed decision as to where to start.

Then we can also do things like relative pricing curves, because a five-year debt instrument should, because of the yield curve being upward sloping normally, be cheaper than seven-year debt. But is it? Absolutely. Is it relatively cheaper? To what? To what curve? We can overlay our own estimation of what we think fair value is for each corporate issuer. And those are also very useful for corporates to say, okay, this is roughly where I might price. This is where the different terms of debt are pricing and maybe where I should target my fundraise. The next phase would be, as I mentioned, this formal offering.

So in South Africa, most exchanges run what’s called the Dutch auction process. That process is where let’s say there are 30 institutions out there who bid in this primary auction, they want to get a piece of your debt. You come into market, you’ve said you’re going to raise a billion rand, your Sasol for example, that billion rand – essentially think of it as a bucket. And the first asset manager will say, I will lend to you at 7%. And the next one will say I’ll lend you at 7.2%. And whoever says the level that fills that bucket – let’s say first asset manager, simple example, R500 million at 7%. Second asset manager, R500 million at 7.2%. Everyone gets 7.2%. The bucket is full at 7.2% and everyone gets that number.

That’s a Dutch auction. It does mean that if the issuer decides, hang on, I’m just going to take R500 million, the price of the debt is significantly cheaper. Suddenly it would be 7%. There is an element of supply and demand that can affect pricing, which we can go into. But again, that process of receiving those bids and ranking them and finding an optimal outcome for the issuer is also one of the tools we offer. We don’t do it – we offer it as a tool to the bank arranger and the corporate so they can have a very interesting discussion during an auction as opposed to working out the maths behind okay, which bids should I take?

It is much more complicated than that. Some corporates might say, I don’t want to borrow from banks because banks already lend to me and I want to preserve my credit lines. As we’ve mentioned, this is one of the reasons you might want to go to public markets. We also need to easily identify which are the banks coming into an auction because they’re also welcome to participate. And we can also show the arranger quite easily who the banks are. We can show certain ratios. You can set targeted ratios to say I want max 30% bank exposure, I want max three-year debt of this and five-year debt of that. I’m massively oversimplifying the bid process, but that’s really where our tool earns its stripes.

The Finance Ghost: Yeah, I think anything complicated can be explained simply. Whether it can be executed simply is something different. I always think if someone can explain something to make it sound simple, it’s because they actually understand it. So, well done on that.

What I do want to just make absolutely clear, also for myself and for anyone listening, it sounds like your client is effectively the treasurer, the CFO, the arranger, the corporate financier, basically on the issuer side of that fence, as opposed to the investor side of that fence. Is that a reasonable summary of how you operate?

Ian Norden: Yeah, I think the market is an ecosystem. As you see on our website, we do talk to two or three different clients. At the core the issue is the client, but they’re very well serviced by the bank arranger. And not just the bank – I say bank arranger, there are other arrangers that aren’t banks – so by the debt arranger, we see the debt arranger as our core client in that regard.

If we can service the debt arranger very well, they can offer a very good service to their corporate clients. We very rarely have direct issuer clients that aren’t brought to us through an arranger. However, there is an option on our platform to self-arrange. Obviously, you then have to sell your own credit and sell your own story. Arranging teams have a distribution function and I think those are very valuable. We position ourselves as a fintech enablement platform, not a disruptive platform. We’re not trying to take someone out of the equation, we’re trying to enable those in the current functions that they’re in to have a more efficient, easier time of it.

If you look at the investor side, investors have many ways to bid on these auctions, whether it’s primary or secondary trading. They can use the phone, they can use Bloomberg, they can use WhatsApp, email, however they choose. We don’t see ourselves as the only way to do it, but certainly another use of our analytics is to offer insights to the investors into what’s trending, what’s pricing well, what’s not pricing well. And by building our own models, we can be an independent voice on what we think the fair value of an asset might be, because there are a lot of supply and demand factors that affect bond prices that might be driven by a certain event, but don’t essentially affect the underlying fair value of the instrument.

The Finance Ghost: Ian, thanks, I think that helps a lot in terms of just setting the scene of who you are really looking to talk to. I think just another point of clarification, also just for me to understand, private companies that are looking to raise debt from interesting places and I think there are quite a few of these, if they’re looking to not necessarily do a listed program, but they want to just have a look in the market at who they should speak to, who are the investors who would invest in notes of this tenure and maybe this credit rating, for example, would that also be an example of your kind of client?

I know that’s probably a bit left field for you, maybe a bit small, but do you also have those sort of clients, the boutique corporate finance houses advising these clients?

Ian Norden: No, we do. I think we’ve grown organically, certainly this year – the last three months, our biggest growth has been in smaller companies coming through, smaller arrangers who’ve gotten wind of us. I think what’s also helped is that the cost of, if we talk about listing a DMTN program on a one of the exchanges, some of the upfront cost is legal. Paying a lawyer to draft a programme memorandum, which is essentially your governing terms and conditions of the program, that cost has come down significantly. You could probably get away with R400,000 or R500,000 now, where it used to be a couple of million a few years ago. I don’t know if that’s cheap for every company, but relatively it’s not a lot of money for some of the bigger companies.

So, to answer your question, if a small company has debt as a priority and we’re seeing some of them come through now, it’s not a big cost because the long-term benefit of setting a program would be significant. If those companies want to come and try and approach private credit providers, I think from experience the best place would be approach a private credit arranging team. And there are lots of them. I don’t want to name any because I’ll alienate someone and they are all potential clients, if not clients. But there are certainly ways to access the private credit markets and get good advice. I think it is important that you do seek advice in this space, even as a large corporate, because there are nuances to raising debt, private or public.

The Finance Ghost: Yeah, absolutely, and that’s why I think this is such an interesting partnership to bring into the Ghost Mail ecosystem, because what you do is so different actually to a lot of other players in the market ultimately, and so focused on debt. It really is such an important source of capital for South African entities, full stop.

And for South African investors, even though typically people are getting exposure to this through their pension funds, for example, or you can go and buy these bond funds, and then they often have a mix of government bonds and corporate bonds as well – so some people do have exposure to this kind of stuff. But, as a retail investor, you’re not going to go and bid directly on a corporate bond on the market in all likelihood. It’s quite big numbers that these things tend to change hands at.

What we will also do in months to come is I think we’ll get some pretty interesting insights from you around this broader debt space. I want to maybe touch on just one other element of it as we start to bring this to a close, which is just the way that ratings agencies work in this ecosystem, because those words, “junk status”, are unfortunately well known to many South Africans who actually have no reason to know it other than because they understand our country’s economic situation. So it’s just one of those things, junk status should not be a relatively household term. It’s an unfortunate situation when it is.

How do these ratings agencies actually add value to this debt ecosystem? And then how different are the costs of debt at these different debt levels? Is that really – you talk about how you grease the wheels in the space. It feels like sometimes the rating agencies are the cars and the wheels and almost the entire story, really?

Ian Norden: Yeah. Junk status, certainly on the face of it, a scary term, probably worth starting with a nuance of credit ratings in that there’s an international view of a company, of a government, and there’s a local view, and every ratings agency will have a mapping table.

So if we look in South Africa, the sovereign government is risk-free because they can just print more money. If you lend to the SA government or any entity they guarantee, they can – whether they will or not is another question – but they can print more rand to pay back that debt. When they raise money overseas in dollars, they can’t do that. They can’t print dollars. They don’t have the dollar press. It sits obviously with the United States.

That is where a global scale might come in and say, South Africa’s junk. I think for the purposes of this discussion and we can maybe go into the global sphere in the future – but for today, if we look at South Africa, everyone then is relatively rated off South Africa. So we go and say, right, South Africa as a government is AAA, what is everything else below that? And then we have a local scale. Certainly in South Africa they are still junk bonds and a junk bond is generally regarded as something that’s uninvestable. You wouldn’t really be putting it into a credit fund that doesn’t have that mandate to be taking big risk. That risk is that you might lose your capital because most of the asset managers out there, they’re offering a balanced fund or a money market fund as a relatively safe haven relative to equities. We only have to look at the last five days to understand the chaos in equity markets with tariffs – they didn’t have the same effects certainly on local bond yields that they had a muted effect on US treasuries for example. But that’s one of the benefits of debt versus equity, is hopefully low volatility and a little bit less correlation.

On a rating side then, you have to look at what’s happened in the last 20 years. And it’s scary to think it was 17 years ago now because I was, well, alive and active in the market. But the financial crisis happened and the financial crisis, I think one of the biggest changes it made to the debt space was it removed a bit of a reliance, a blind reliance on ratings agencies. So some people – I remember doing an open top bus tour of New York and they still teased that AIG was responsible for the financial crash and the insurance companies. But it was also linked to the ratings agencies saying: this is AAA, we think it’s risk free, go and buy it. And again, we won’t comment on whether that was right or wrong, but what happened was a lot of the asset managers locally and globally in-housed their own credit expertise. Now what you find is a large asset manager will certainly look to a rating and say, well, there’s some guidance there and there’s certainly value in having companies be rated. But from a reliance perspective, they’ll have their own teams. They’ll then do the credit work, they’ll come up with their own credit spread, which is a proxy for the riskiness of the bond and they will then use that as their best estimate and rather use the rating as a second check. Whereas I think previously it was the other way around.

So ratings certainly have a place. A rating, when you list a programme, shows on a fundamental balance sheet and company strength analysis that someone’s come in and done some good due diligence on your company and it’s got a relative strength. But from a day-to-day perspective, we must remember companies aren’t being rated every day, so they have to just be another tool in the market. I don’t think they must be the only tool.

The Finance Ghost: I think this has been a really interesting podcast. Thank you. I do have to chuckle slightly in that if anyone could hear a bit of background noise, it’s actually because as much as Ian has got these wonderful noise-cancelling coffee shop headphones, they were not designed for window cleaning behind him with this beautiful view over Cape Town in the building he’s currently in. That was not in the startup design spec! They didn’t think about fancy windows getting cleaned behind there. So maybe next time, we’ll have to do it from a coffee shop – you can go full fintech on us and the noise cancelling will work. It’s just mildly funny. There are a lot of windows there and of course this was the window that was getting cleaned during the podcast.

But I always enjoy these things because they actually – that’s just part of the game, right? I try not to actually take them out because they almost – it’s just…

Ian Norden: …it wouldn’t be a talk about the markets, you know Ghost, if we didn’t have a black swan event, would it really be a talk about the markets?

The Finance Ghost: There we go. 100%. What I can tell you is the risk of that one window being the one getting cleaned right now is surely higher than some of these corporate bonds falling over. I think we’ll leave it there. We’re going to see more and hear more from Intengo in Ghost Mail in months to come as you bring insights into this debt market to the audience. And for those who have listened to this and gone, that’s interesting, we’re active in the debt market, we want to understand more about how Intengo can help us, what is the right way to get hold of you?

Ian Norden: I think the simplest is to go to our website as you mentioned, intengomarket.com, we have a contact us button that’s actively managed, that mailbox. Alternatively, drop me a mail at ian@intengomarket.com very simple. And yeah, we look forward to engaging with yourself, Ghost and your listeners more over time. Thank you.

The Finance Ghost: Brilliant. Thanks, Ian. And we look forward to that. Ciao.

Ian Norden: Thanks.

For more information, visit intengomarket.com.

GHOST BITES (Castleview – SA Corporate Real Estate | Remgro | Schroder European Real Estate)

Castleview ups its stake in SA Corporate Real Estate (JSE: CVW | JSE: SAC)

Western Europe really isn’t offering much excitement at the moment

Castleview Property Fund, which owns a controlling stake in Emira Property Fund (JSE: EMI), also clearly likes the look of SA Corporate Real Estate. In February this year, they announced that they had bought derivatives referencing the underlying shares, as well as a direct stake of shares to the value of R139 million.

The latest news is that they have sold derivatives and bought more direct shares to the value of R756 million. This is buying the dip at scale, with the latest purchase being at R2.76 per share vs. the initial purchase at R2.85 per share.

The two purchases combined represent 323 million shares. Based on the number of issued shares at SA Corporate Real Estate, this puts them on roughly a 12.5% stake in the fund (ignoring the derivatives, which I’ve gotta tell you are pretty light on details in the announcement).

The thing that I don’t understand is why we haven’t seen a SENS announcement from SA Corporate Real Estate as of yet. Whenever a shareholder moves through a 5% ownership threshold, there should be an announcement…


Remgro is on a charm offensive (JSE: REM)

It’s just a pity that they are obsessed with dividends

Remgro hosted a capital markets day and made the presentations available online. If you want to dig into them in detail, you’ll find them here.

The best slide for me is this one:

Essentially, Remgro is pointing out that they are in much better shape than they were before the pandemic, yet the discount to the INAV is much higher than it was before. Sentiment towards investment holding companies is really poor on the JSE, not helped by the likes of African Rainbow Capital and their plan to delist at a significant discount to INAV, supported by a valuation from an independent expert. As an investor, it’s hard to look at something like this and conclude that these discounts will close.

Something that would help a lot would be for Remgro to scrap the dividend and focus entirely on buybacks at this discount to INAV. That would be the textbook route to take from a capital allocation perspective. I suspect that there are major shareholders who have gotten so used to the Remgro dividend that this simply isn’t an option. Still, even if there’s some short-term volatility in the share price as dividend-focused investors try to exit, I’m quite sure that there would be enough buyers who would be encouraged by this superior capital allocation strategy.

Instead, we have to suffer through one slide that proudly shows the dividend growth:

Followed immediately by this one that makes it sound like you need a world-famous detective to figure out what the discount to INAV refuses to close:

Two words: share buybacks. Do more share buybacks! Sigh.

Don’t hold your breath, as this slide (including my annotation of the key block) makes it very clear that not prioritising the cash dividend would be a “betrayal of the fundamental tenet” at Remgro. Why not just rename it to Remcash then, as clearly that’s the priority?

Moving on from my capital allocation frustrations, I must note that with 26% of the portfolio sitting in healthcare, it’s perhaps not surprising that this was a major focus area. The capital markets day presentation was accompanied by a financial update from Mediclinic, where USD-denominated revenue grew 5% and adjusted EBITDA margin expanded from 14.7% to 15.0%. Yay for that – finally some decent numbers coming from hospital groups!

The suite of presentations also includes one on Remgro Infrastructure – and specifically CIVH, the company with which Vodacom has been trying to do a fibre deal that the competition authorities don’t like. The hearing in the Competition Appeal Court has been set for 22 to 24 July, with an expected ruling by September 2025. Just in case the deal doesn’t go ahead, management outlined their strategy going forward and the potential for return on investment to move significantly higher as fibre penetration rates increase.

For me, until share buybacks become a larger priority than cash dividends, I have no interest in holding shares in Remgro.


Schroder’s portfolio valuations are still dropping (JSE: SCD)

Western Europe really isn’t offering much excitement at the moment

In the same way that people tend to lump Africa together as though all the countries are similar (clearly a huge mistake), many investors treat “Europe” as one place. This couldn’t be further from the truth. The growth prospects in Poland and Portugal definitely aren’t the same as in France or Germany for that matter.

Schroder European Real Estate Trust is a useful way to see that in practice. The fund releases quarterly valuation updates and the direction of travel usually seems to be down. Sure enough, the latest quarter reflects a like-for-like decrease of -0.3% over the quarter, with the industrial portfolio helping to mitigate much of the pain.

The segmental movements are important, with industrial up 1.8% (a combination of rental growth and more supportive valuation yields), while office fell by 0.9%. The silver lining for the offices is that at least they fell by much less than in the previous quarter, when they were down 2.4%.

There’s only one retail asset left in the fund, so looking at the 2% decrease in value in that asset and drawing any broader conclusions about the asset class would be foolish, particularly as the decrease is mainly due to the shorter remaining lease term.

Given the automotive sector troubles, I was pretty surprised to see that the valuation of the Cannes car showroom was unchanged. These are specialist properties and I don’t think many people have positive sentiment towards this sector at the moment.

The fund will be changing valuers from Knight Frank to Savills with effect from the end of June. Before you get suspicious, a “shadow valuation” by Savills has shown a consistent valuation with the numbers that Knight Frank has been achieving. They attribute the change in service provider to best practice and governance, in the same way that you would want to see an auditor rotation.


Nibbles:

  • Director dealings:
    • Des de Beer bought another R7.5 million worth of shares in Lighthouse Properties (JSE: LTE). I’m quite sure he was a major participant in the scrip distribution, although we have to wait for confirmation of that. Separately, Lighthouse confirmed that holders of roughly 47% of eligible shares chose the scrip dividend alternative, so more than half of shareholders preferred the cash.
    • The CEO bought R510k worth of shares in Ascendis Health (JSE: ASC). This purchase was matched by Calibre Investment Holdings, an associate of a non-executive director, so that means insider buying of over R1 million in total. This is an interesting follow-on to the recent failed take-private.
    • An associate of a non-executive director of Sun International (JSE: SUI) bought shares worth R874k.
    • An associate of a non-executive director of BHP (JSE: BHG) bought shares worth just over R600k.
    • An associate of a director of iOCO (JSE: IOC) bought shares worth R20.7k.
  • Gold Fields (JSE: GFI) has a headache in Ghana, where the Minerals Commission has rejected the company’s application for a lease extension at Damang Mining. This is despite Gold Fields protesting on the basis that the application has fulfilled all statutory requirements. The government has now served an eviction notice to Gold Fields, with the company having to be off the site by 18th April – yes, in just a few days from now! Nothing is ever easy or predictable in Africa.
  • Something may finally be happening at Kibo Energy (JSE: KBO), with the company confirming that it is at an advanced stage in its assessment of potential projects for acquisition as part of a reverse takeover transaction. For this reason, trading in the shares listed on the AIM in London will be suspended as a precautionary measure. The JSE rules are different to those in London and trading won’t be suspended here. I’ve always found it odd that trading can be suspended on one exchange but not the other, as it really seems to defeat the purpose of the precaution.
  • The chairperson of Jubilee Metals (JSE: JBL), Ollie Oliveira, is retiring from his position with effect from 30 April 2025. He will be succeeded by Dr Mathews Phosa, currently the vice-chairperson. Also, interim finance director Jonathan Morley-Kirk has been appointed to that role on a permanent basis.
  • As part of the broader investment by Kinetic Development Group in MC Mining (JSE: MCZ), there are two new director appointments to the board at MC Mining. One is the CFO of Kinetic Asia, while the other is a highly experienced executive with tons of experience in Asia.
  • Hedge fund manager All Weather Capital has increased its stake in Trencor (JSE: TRE) from 4.56% to 7.48% ahead of the intended winding up of that company.

Raising the ghost of Smoot-Hawley

We can’t guess where the tariffs and trade war will end up. Instead, we can just revisit the historical parallel. As the saying goes: history doesn’t always repeat itself, but it often rhymes.

Disclaimer, dear reader: I am not, nor will I ever be, an economist. But I’d be lying if I didn’t admit that in the past two weeks, I’ve unintentionally enrolled in a crash course in geopolitics and economics, all thanks to the whirlwind of activity stirred up by US President Donald Trump’s tariffs. 

When I pitched the Ghost an article about the tariff situation, he politely suggested that I steer clear of the whole messy business, since neither one of us could weigh in as an expert on this subject. He’s not wrong. Fortunately, I am more experienced in history and storytelling than I am in economics. And boy do I have a story for you. 

Against the backdrop of escalating trade tensions and policy reversals, I reckon it’s worth revisiting a historical parallel: the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. This legislation, intended to protect American jobs and farmers during the onset of the Great Depression, instead exacerbated economic woes, leading to retaliatory measures from trading partners and a significant contraction in international trade. 

I won’t be so bold as to say that the parallels between then and now serve as a cautionary tale, highlighting the potential unintended (or intended?) consequences of protectionist trade policies. Instead, I’ll simply tell the story and leave you to draw your own conclusions. 

The stage is set

By the late 1920s, America was quite literally buzzing. Electrification had swept across the nation, lighting up factories and powering an industrial boom that cranked up productivity like never before. Assembly lines were moving faster, goods were getting cheaper, and the gears of capitalism were whirring with giddy optimism. Add to that the rise of oil refineries and the slow retirement of horses and mules as modes of transportation, and it looked like the US was cooking. 

Once motor vehicles took over, a huge chunk of farmland (which had once been reserved to feed all those hardworking horses) was suddenly up for grabs. All that available land, combined with a few thousand enthusiastic farmers, resulted in a surplus of crops that no-one quite knew what to do with. American farms were producing more than ever, but American consumers weren’t buying fast enough to keep up. Real and nominal wages were rising, yes, but not nearly at the pace of productivity. In economic terms, this was great for charts, bad for wallets.

Along came one Senator Reed Smoot, who took one look at the mountain of unsold fruit and veg and figured the solution was simple – the government just needed to nudge Americans back towards spending their money on local produce. In his mind, the best way to achieve this was to slap tariffs on imports. Make the imported stuff more expensive, and surely Americans would have no choice but to buy local. It seemed like a feasible plan on paper, but there was a significant hurdle to success: the US was already exporting more manufactured goods than it was importing, thanks to all those swanky electric factories. In fact, America was running a trade surplus. Manufactured imports were up, sure, but exports were up even more. The real deficit was in food exports, which had been steadily declining. And while food imports were growing, they only added up to about half the value of manufactured imports. The math wasn’t quite mathing.

Then came the famous market crash. By late 1929, the global economy was starting to nosedive, and America’s knee-jerk reaction was to throw up the drawbridge – protect the jobs, protect the farmers, and brace for impact. The Great Depression hadn’t fully landed yet, but the storm clouds were already forming. In trying to shield itself from the world, the US may have just sped up the unraveling.

An ill-advised option

Reed Smoot (Utah Senator, Mormon elder, and tariff enthusiast) teamed up with Willis C. Hawley (Oregon Representative and proud chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee) to cook up one of the most controversial ideas in the annals of economics: the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act.

It all started with a promise. In his 1928 presidential campaign, Herbert Hoover – Republican golden boy and walking embodiment of technocratic optimism – pledged to raise tariffs on farm goods to protect struggling American farmers. But once he took office, the requests started rolling in. And by “requests,” I mean full-throttle lobbying from every other industry under the sun. Steel, textiles, chemicals – you name it, they wanted in. Why should farmers have all the tariff fun?

Most Republicans were on board. But when the first attempt to push through a tariff hike came up in 1929, it hit a wall put up by a bunch of moderate Republican senators who weren’t quite ready to light the whole trade system on fire.

Then came the stock market crash.

Suddenly, economic panic was in the air, and protectionism started sounding less like a bad idea and more like a lifeboat. So back to Congress the bill went, and this time, it squeaked through the Senate by a razor-thin 44–42 vote. The House of Representatives, always the overachiever in group projects, passed it without much fuss.

Meanwhile, economists across the country collectively facepalmed. In May 1930, more than 1,000 of them signed a petition begging President Hoover to veto the bill. Even Thomas Lamont, erstwhile head of J.P. Morgan, reported that he practically got on his knees, begging Hoover to stop the act. But Hoover, ever the engineer, thought he had it all under control. He signed the bill into law on June 17, 1930, comforted by the idea that the president could tweak individual tariffs later if things got messy, up or down by 50%, no big deal.

Spoiler alert: things got messy.

From bad to worse

Grievances started rolling in almost before the ink on Hoover’s signature had dried.

The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act sent a not-so-subtle message to the rest of the world that America was closing shop. For countries already buckling under the weight of the Great Depression, not to mention the massive tab left behind by World War I, it landed like a gut punch. Germany, in particular, took a hard hit. Already juggling war reparations and a crumbling economy, it suddenly had even fewer ways to earn the foreign currency needed to make payments. As it turns out, it’s tough to pay someone back when they won’t buy anything from you.

America was essentially demanding international debt repayments while simultaneously blocking the very goods those payments would’ve come from. The rest of the world didn’t take it lying down either. Within a short time, 25 countries hit back with their own tariffs, and what followed was essentially a global fit of economic door-slamming. Between 1929 and 1934, world trade collapsed by a staggering 66%. US exports and imports both plummeted. No-one was buying, no-one was selling. Canada took the opportunity to pivot and cozied up to the British Empire at the 1932 British Empire Economic Conference. France and Britain, clearly not amused, started building new trade alliances. Germany, boxed in and unbelievably broke, turned to clearing agreements instead of trade.

Today, economists and historians around the world agree that while the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act didn’t set off the Great Depression (that was already brewing), it definitely deepened it and extended America’s economic recovery by multiple years. Some historians have even made the argument that by kicking the global economy while it was already down, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act helped to translate economic chaos into political chaos. Economic desperation in Germany created the perfect storm for extremist ideologies to thrive, which may have helped clear the runway for Adolf Hitler and set the stage for World War ll.

Turns out, protectionism didn’t protect much.

The spinoff 

When Smoot-Hawley passed in 1930, unemployment in the US was already a troubling 8%. The tariff was sold as a fix and a way to protect American jobs. Unfortunately, it achieved the opposite. By 1931, unemployment had doubled to 16%. By 1932, it hit 25%. 

Now, to be fair, not all of that can be pinned on the tariff. As we’ve established, the Great Depression had already begun, thanks to a toxic brew of financial recklessness, plummeting demand, and a banking system built like a house of cards. But while Smoot-Hawley didn’t start the fire, it definitely poured gasoline on it: trade collapsed, farmers were gutted, and export-heavy industries got slammed. 

By 1932, the Democrats ran on a promise to rip up the tariff playbook. And after Roosevelt  won, he and the newly Democratic Congress passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Suddenly, the president and not Congress had the power to negotiate tariff cuts, country by country. No need for a two-thirds Senate vote, just a regular majority. It happened so quickly that you might have missed it if you blinked, but it was a seismic shift in who controlled US trade policy.

And that shift has stuck. Fast forward nearly a century, and Donald Trump was out on the campaign trail saying he could slap tariffs on other countries without Congressional sign-off. And he wasn’t wrong – he was just taking full advantage of the powers handed down through decades of tariff delegation. If you’ve been asking yourself why it feels like one man is able to make and break the world economy with the stroke of a pen these days, well, there’s part of your answer. The ghost of Smoot-Hawley may be in the room with us right now.

About the author: Dominique Olivier

Dominique Olivier is the founder of human.writer, where she uses her love of storytelling and ideation to help brands solve problems.

She is a weekly columnist in Ghost Mail and collaborates with The Finance Ghost on Ghost Mail Weekender, a Sunday publication designed to help you be more interesting. She now also writes a regular column for Daily Maverick.

Dominique can be reached on LinkedIn here.

GHOST BITES (Delta Property Fund | Gemfields | Vukile Property Fund)

Property sales continue at Delta (JSE: DLT)

Two sales have been completed and new ones have been announced

Delta Property Fund has been trying to sell off properties as part of a need to urgently bring down the loan-to-value ratio in the fund. The deals don’t always close due to various conditions attached to the transactions, so it’s good to see that the deals for Anchor House and Thuto House (both in Bloemfontein) have now concluded and properties have been transferred.

A new deal has been announced in the form of 88 Field Street in Durban for R76 million. The non-refundable deposit is R3.8 million, so there’s still a long way to go from there. Guarantees for the remaining R72.2 million are due within 90 days from signature of the transfer agreements.

The property has a vacancy rate of 34.9% and net operating income of R6.5 million. It was valued at the end of February 2024 at R135.9 million, although achieving that number would require a huge improvement in the vacancy rate. The selling price of R76 million and the current net operating income implies a yield of 8.6%, so it feels like Delta is actually getting a decent price here considering the underlying performance of the building.

As Delta’s market cap is just R185 million because of the level of debt in the fund, this is a Category 1 deal that requires a circular to be issued to shareholders. It’s hard enough bringing the balance sheet in line. It’s even harder when the cost of doing each deal is so high due to the regulatory requirements. Such is life as a listed company though – if you want to step into that arena, you need to play by the rules.


The pressure was too much for Gemfields (JSE: GML)

They need to raise more capital from shareholders

Over the past year, when I’ve written on Gemfields, I’ve pointed out that the company has been busy with a high-risk capex programme at around the same time that market dynamics weren’t looking favourable. The share price is has lost nearly 60% of its value in the past year and this is a prime example of a dip that I avoided buying, as I felt that the underlying risks were just too great.

I’m glad I stayed out of the way. The share price dropped 23% on Friday to R1.16 in response to the release of poor results and the announcement of a rights issue to raise $30 million. The market cap is R1.35 billion, so that’s meaningful dilution for shareholders who don’t follow their rights.

The rights offer is priced at R1.07 per share, so the share is still trading above the rights offer price. The rights offer was set at a decent discount to the price before this drop, but much of the discount has now closed. This might be good news for the underwriters, as rights offers with smaller discounts tend to leave some crumbs on the table for the underwriters to pick up. Sure enough, there are two underwriters who have put their hands up: Assore International Holdings (AIH) and Rational Expectations, who are currently the largest shareholders in the company. Between them, the offer is fully underwritten.

Gemfields certainly needs the money. In fact, they need it so urgently that those two shareholders have put loans into the company for a total of $13.4 million. In case you’re wondering how that number was calculated, it’s the pro-rata share of the rights offer attributable to those two shareholders. Essentially, they are pre-paying their portion of the rights offer as a loan that will be set off against the rights offer proceeds later on. Then, if any of the rights aren’t taken up in the market, they are happy to take up more than their pro-rata allocation, which would mean a further cash injection.

To help you understand how Gemfields got into this kind of trouble, we can refer to the results for the year ended December 2024. Revenue fell by around 19% and although they did bring operating costs down slightly, it was nowhere near enough to save the EBITDA story. EBITDA margin was down sharply from 31.7% to 19.2%. By the time you reach the bottom of the income statement, you’re dealing with a headline loss per share of 2.1 US cents.

Perhaps most importantly, they’ve swung from net cash of $11 million as at the end of December 2023 to net debt of $80.4 million by the end of 2024. You can see why they need to raise cash, as relying on things like a potential sale of Faberge just isn’t certain enough. At this stage, they’ve only received non-binding offers for that business. The balance sheet is going to get worse before it gets better, with the circular for the rights issue noting that Gemfields expects to be in a net debt position of over $100 million once they’ve fully drawn down on their debt to meet ongoing capex requirements.

They certainly took the high-risk approach with this capex programme, leaving little margin for error or bad luck. Sadly, they’ve had plenty of difficulties that pushed them over the edge, ranging from an oversupply of Zambian emeralds through to fewer premium rough rubies in Mozambique and other issues.

Is it guaranteed that things will improve? No, definitely not. All you need to do is look at the diamond market to realise that products like emeralds and rubies aren’t immune to disruption or major changes to market dynamics. I would recommend referring to the detailed circular for the full picture of the risks and how the company is responding to them.


Vukile pulls the trigger on Forum Madeira in Portugal (JSE: VKN)

This is firmly part of the broader Iberian Peninsula strategy

If you’ve been following Vukile Property Fund, you’ll know that they have a 99.5% holding in Castellana Properties, their Spanish property investment vehicle. It’s a bit broader than just Spain actually, as Portugal has also caught the eye of South African property funds.

Vukile was an early adopter of the Iberian Peninsula trend, with more REITs now looking for opportunities in that region for much the same reasons that make Eastern Europe popular: these countries offer higher growth opportunities within the broader European safety net.

The latest such example is the acquisition of Forum Madeira in Portugal, a shopping centre on the island that features an open-air cinema. As you can guess, there’s a strong tourist element to this business model. The GDP of Madeira has grown at pretty epic levels and unemployment is down at 5.9%. They are loving the tourism story in Madeira and it sounds like a solid place to invest.

The property is being acquired for €63.3 million, so that’s a meaty price tag. The initial net operating income yield is 9.5%, reminding us once more than you can own a prime shopping centre in Madeira on a similar yield to the average buy-to-let residential property in South Africa. This is why I far prefer owning REITs to having direct property ownership. The property was independently valued in November 2024 at €72.8 million, so either they’ve gotten it at a discount or the valuation assumptions have deteriorated since then based on macroeconomic risks. It’s probably a bit of both.

It’s worth noting that Vukile isn’t going to have 100% of the earnings. Castellana is doing the deal through its 70%-owned subsidiary Caminho Propicio. This means that Vukile will control the centre through the structure, but will only enjoy 69.65% of the earnings (remember that there’s a tiny minority interest in Castellana as well). In case you’re wondering, the other 30% shareholder in Caminho Propicio is RMB, so Vukile is strongly in bed with its bankers.

The deal will be funded by in-country debt of €28 million, with the rest coming from existing cash resources. The loan-to-value ratio for the deal is therefore 38.5%. It’s interesting that they calculate the ratio based on the independent value of the property, not what they are actually paying for it.


Nibbles:

  • Director dealings:
    • Des de Beer bought another R14.2 million worth of shares in Lighthouse Properties (JSE: LTE), so this has been another strong buying season for him.
    • A non-executive director of BHP Group (JSE: BHG) bought shares worth R4.1 million.
    • The CEO of Santam (JSE: SNT) bought shares worth R613k.
  • Montauk Renewables (JSE: MKR) broke ground on a renewable natural gas landfill gas project in Oklahoma. They expect to invest between $25 million and $35 million in this project, with a target commissioning date in the first quarter of 2027.
  • Due to the ongoing liquidation process and the fact that financials for the year ended June 2023 are still outstanding, Conduit Capital (JSE: CND) has renewed its cautionary announcement.

PODCAST: Positioning for tariff turmoil

Listen to the podcast here:


In this special edition of Investec’s No Ordinary Wednesday podcast, we delve into the recent market turmoil following President Donald Trump’s controversial tariff announcements, which led to a staggering $5 trillion loss in the S&P 500 in just two days. Investec Wealth & Investment International’s Chief Investment Strategist, Chris Holdsworth, and Investment Strategist, Osagyefo Mazwai discuss implications for the global and local economies, investment portfolios and the future of markets.

Hosted by seasoned broadcaster, Jeremy Maggs, the No Ordinary Wednesday podcast unpacks the latest economic, business and political news in South Africa, with an all-star cast of investment and wealth managers, economists and financial planners from Investec. Listen in every second Wednesday for an in-depth look at what’s moving markets, shaping the economy, and changing the game for your wallet and your business.


Also on Spotify and Apple Podcasts:

GHOST BITES (Anglo American | Choppies | Life Healthcare | Murray & Roberts | Renergen | Tharisa | Trematon)

Anglo’s deal with Peabody is under fire – literally (JSE: AGL)

Will we see a material adverse change clause being triggered here?

Nothing ever seems to be simple at Anglo American. Although they’ve undoubtedly created a number of problems for themselves along the way, they’ve also had some bad luck. The latest such example is an “ignition event” (i.e. a fire) at the Moranbah North mine that is part of the steelmaking coal business that Peabody Energy is buying.

Well, that they are in theory buying. Peabody has come out with a statement that they are “reviewing all options” in relation to the deal. In other words, the lawyers are pointing out the material adverse change clauses in the deal and the corporate financiers are working with the accountants to figure out if the fire exceeds any thresholds that are in the agreement.

This isn’t an uncommon thing. Imagine if you were buying a car, but you would only take ownership in 6 months and the current owner will continue to use the car for that period. Wouldn’t you want some kind of protection regarding the condition of the vehicle by the time you take ownership? This is what material adverse change clauses do.

Anglo American is downplaying it of course, referring to a “minor ignition” and the camera footage showing no evidence of damage. Again, nothing unusual here – the lawyers are making sure that Peabody puts out grave-sounding announcements in case they want to pull out of the deal, while Anglo is making it sound like it would be ridiculous for Peabody to do so.

And so the corporate dance continues…


Choppies is selling its business in Zimbabwe (JSE: CHP)

This isn’t exactly the biggest deal that you’ll see on the market

Choppies is selling Choppies Zimbabwe to Pintail Trading, a competing retailer in the southern region of Zimbabwe. The buyer isn’t a related party to Choppies.

It’s a tiny deal, with a price of just $260k. This is really just a case of getting rid of a headache, allowing Choppies to focus on regions where it believes it can be profitable. Instead of throwing more capital at Zimbabwe, they are simply getting out with a clean exit and a small cash inflow.

The Choppies market cap is R1.9 billion, so this disposal is truly a rounding error in the bigger picture.


You have to read the Life Healthcare update carefully (JSE: LHC)

There are some important earnings adjustments

Life Healthcare is in the process of selling the LMI business in a deal that shareholders almost unanimously voted in favour of. Against this backdrop, they’ve also released an earnings update dealing with the six months to March 2025.

Although there are some timing differences related to Easter, the southern African business experienced a 2% uptick in Paid Patient Days (PPD) and a 6.1% increase in revenue per PPD. This has driven revenue growth of between 8% and 9%, which is pretty good for a hospital group.

Now, you would expect to see that kind of number driving a significant jump in HEPS. Instead, once you work through the adjustments to arrive at pro-forma HEPS from continuing operations, you find a move of between -5% and +7.1%. In other words, barely positive at the midpoint. If you use pro-forma normalised earnings per share from continuing operations (no kidding), then the increase is between 0.2% and 12.3%.

Here’s the thing that a lot of shareholders probably didn’t realise: there’s a large contingent consideration payable to Piramal Enterprises, the previous owners of LMI. This is a good example of being on the wrong side of an Agterskot! The fair value adjustment is a huge R2.9 billion, or 203 cents per share. They exclude this from normalised earnings per share and from pro-forma HEPS. It will be included in HEPS from continuing operations though due to technical definitions, which means that Life will actually report a substantial headline loss this period.

There are other adjustments in the numbers as well, mainly related to payments to LMI management. These deals are complicated.

Results are due for release on 22 May. I suspect that most investors will focus on operating profit and whether the increase in revenue actually led to better margins. It’s pretty hard to tell from this trading statement whether that was the case or not.


The show is over for Murray & Roberts shareholders (JSE: MUR)

As I suspected from the business rescue plan, it is indeed a doughnut

Zero. Niks. Nada. F*kol. That’s what Murray & Roberts shareholders will be receiving from the business rescue process. Although that did come through pretty strongly for me in the business rescue plan, it wasn’t explicit. The release of interim results by the company has now confirmed the position.

Here it is, in black and white (and yellow):

For employees and other stakeholders, the mining business will continue operating. This is because the business is being rescued, even if it comes at the expense of shareholders. This is obviously a vastly preferred outcome to the whole thing shutting down, but it’s a timely reminder that shareholders very rarely get anything out of a business rescue process.

Remaining announcements from the company will sadly be administrative in nature as the various processes are followed to wind-up the company.


Finally, some good news for Renergen (JSE: REN)

But what about the court proceedings?

Those who have been following the recent news at Renergen will know that the company has been locked in battle with Springbok Solar regarding a development that has been at odds with Tetra4’s production right. Tetra4 is Renergen’s subsidiary that houses the helium assets.

The big news for Renergen is that the defective Section 53 MPRDA approval for Springbok Solar has been revoked, based on Renergen’s appeal to the Director-General of the MPRDA. It was specifically found that Springbok Solar failed to consult Tetra4 as required by regulations.

The share price closed 14% higher as the market celebrated this outcome. I’m certainly no expert in this space, but it doesn’t look as though the court judgement has been handed down yet. This means there is still the risk of something going wrong. The devil is always in the details in these processes and making assumptions is very dangerous.


Tharisa’s production has been impacted by the weather (JSE: THA)

At least Q2 was ahead of Q1, though

Tharisa has released a production report for the quarter ended March 2025. If you compare the numbers to the immediately preceding three months, then both PGM and chrome production came in higher. Prices for PGMs were also up, although chrome prices were well down.

The group’s net cash position decreased from $89 million at the end of December to $79.3 million at the end of March, mainly due to an increase in debt.

If you look at the six months on a year-on-year basis rather than sequentially, then PGM production fell by 12.2% and chrome concentrate production was down nearly 13%. PGM prices in USD increased by 4%, but chrome prices were down just over 12%.

You can therefore see why the price is down 20% over 12 months, as the PGM price move isn’t enough to offset the dip in PGM production, while both key chrome metrics went the wrong way.


Trematon should be repurchasing shares instead of focusing on dividends (JSE: TMT)

At least include some buybacks in the strategy to return capital to shareholders

Trematon is an investment holding company, which means they trade at a discount to intrinsic NAV. If you are wondering why, just refer to the recent African Rainbow Capital transaction and then consider the bad name that it gives to the entire sector, as they’ve basically turned the discount to INAV from a market estimate into an observable fact.

Where does this leave Trematon? Well, they plan to sell off assets and distribute proceeds to shareholders. Over time, this reduces the INAV. But what it doesn’t do is reduce the INAV per share, as they are paying dividends rather than doing share buybacks. All this does is reduce the share price over time, which means anyone looking at the company needs to constantly remember that there were prior dividends. I must acknowledge that I forgot this when writing about the trading statement that preceded this announcement, in which I pointed out the downward trend in INAV, so my apologies for that.

The point here is that buybacks, which would protect INAV per share (and perhaps even enhance it), while returning capital to shareholders, would be preferred to dividends. Liquidity is the obvious challenge here, but the average daily traded volumes aren’t too bad.

If we dig into the underlying assets, we find 1% revenue growth at Generation Education. Student numbers and operating profit fell year-on-year and the schools are sub-scale. They need to try attract more students without deviating from what makes these schools different. The group has raised external funding in the schools business and has seen its shareholding decrease from 82.7% to 68.2%. You have to wonder if diluting ownership at this point in the Generation journey is really the optimal approach, particularly when they’ve unlocked capital through other disposals (e.g. Aria) that could’ve been allocated into the schools. If they have their doubts about the business, then they also can’t expect the market to form an orderly queue to buy Trematon shares.

Club Mykonos in Langebaan also saw a drop in profits, contributing just R2.6 million to group profits in this period. It’s a decent cash generator, but those are marginal numbers at the end of the day. The development of the last piece of land at the resort is imminent.

There are a couple of other property assets as well, with an overall flavour of asset disposals rather than acquisitions being clearly visible.

The TL;DR here is that Generation is now the biggest asset. Trematon isn’t exactly showing growth in that asset and is happily diluting its stake in the business, while paying dividends instead of doing share buybacks. I must tell you that none of this fills me with confidence.

The INAV per share is 344 cents and the share price is R2.00, so that’s a 42% discount to INAV. As investment holding companies go, that’s actually a pretty standard discount.


Nibbles:

  • Director dealings:
    • Des de Beer bought shares in Lighthouse Properties (JSE: LTE) worth R11.25 million.
    • A non-executive director of BHP (JSE: BHG) bought shares worth a meaty R833k.
    • A director of a major subsidiary of Shoprite Holdings (JSE: SHP) bought shares worth R261k.
    • The CEO of Momentum Group (JSE: MTM) bought shares worth R234k.
    • The CEO’s spouse bought shares in Purple Group (JSE: PPE) worth R195k.
    • A non-executive director of STADIO (JSE: SDO) bought shares for his minor child worth R5.5k. Start ’em young!
  • Nu-World (JSE: NWL) has a market cap of just R545 million. This is a typical small cap with limited liquidity in its stock. The results for the six months to February 2025 reflect revenue growth of 28.8%, which obviously sounds fantastic. Although blunted somewhat by the time we get to HEPS growth, there’s certainly nothing wrong with HEPS being up 19.2%. Margins are under pressure in the business due to levels of competition in the market. Another interesting nugget is that the company saw an increase in sales from the two-pot savings withdrawals, so this revenue growth should be treated with caution in terms of how sustainable it is (or isn’t). As a final comment, the company saw solid growth in revenue in Australia, so here’s a rare example of a South African company seeing some success in that frightening land of spiders, snakes and broken retail dreams.
  • Wesizwe Platinum (JSE: WEZ) is still trying to recover from a cyberattack in December 2024. This has led to ongoing delays in the publication of financials for the year ended December 2024. And perhaps most importantly, they are still working on the approval for the letter of support beyond the current funding cap of $1.52 billion. This requires approval from the China National Development and Reform Committee (NDRC). Given the South Africa – China relations, you would think that this is an easy thing to get right, but it does seem to be taking its time. This is all part of Wesizwe’s broader plans to obtain funding for the Bakubung Project.
  • Mpact (JSE: MPT) announced a couple of new independent non-executive director appointments, including Sbu Luthuli as lead independent director.
  • Purple Group (JSE: PPE) announced that chairperson Happy Ntshingila is stepping down on a temporary basis due to requirements under the Legal Practice Act (nothing untoward here – Ntshingile is completing a pupillage). Craig Carter will act as interim chairperson.

Weekly corporate finance activity by SA exchange-listed companies

0

In an update to shareholders, Anglo American (Anglo) advised that, subject to shareholder approval on 30 April 2025, the expected demerger date of Anglo American Platinum (Amplats) from the group to be 31 May 2025. Anglo confirming it would continue to hold an c.19.9% shareholding in Amplats for at least 90 days following the demerger. During 2024 Anglo sold down an 11.9% shareholding in Amplats from its original 79% stake. The remaining stake will be distributed to Anglo shareholders who will each receive 110 Amplats shares for every 1,075 Anglo shares held. Amplats is seeking a secondary listing on the LSE which will be in addition to the existing primary listing on the JSE. In conjunction with the demerger, Anglo intends to carry out a share consolidation to provide consistency in the Anglo share price before and after the demerger process.

BHP Group has purchased 3,234,465 shares in the open market on the ASX, LSE and JSE exchanges at an average price of A$39.68, £19.23 and R448.67 per share. The shares were purchased in terms of its Dividend Reinvestment Plan (DRIP).

The JSE has approved the transfer of the listing of Grand Parade Investments to the General Segment of Main Board with effect from 10 April 2025. The listing requirements in this segment are less onerous for the smaller and mid-cap firms.

This week the following companies repurchased shares:

EPE Capital Partners has acquired 13,500,000 A shares in an intra-group repurchase with EPE Capital Fundco. The shares were repurchased at R4.90 per share for a total value of R66,15 million. These, and other shares held in treasury, totalling 31,086,046 in aggregate, will be delisted and cancelled.

During the period 19 February 2025 to 4 April 2025, Netcare repurchased 42,713,982 ordinary shares at an average price per share of R13.1359 for an aggregate R561,1 million. The repurchase was funded from cash generated by operations.

Schroder European Real Estate Trust plc acquired a further 318,400 shares this week at an average price of 65 pence per share for an aggregate £206,307. The shares will be held in Treasury.

On March 6, 2025, Ninety One plc announced that it would undertake a repurchase programme of up to £30 million. The shares will be purchased in the open market and cancelled to reduce the Company’s ordinary share capital. This week the company repurchased a further 823,202 ordinary shares at an average price of 125 pence for an aggregate £1,03m.

In its annual financial statements released in August 2024, South32 announced that it would increase its capital management programme by US$200 million, to be returned via an on-market share buy-back. This week 860,579 shares were repurchased at an aggregate cost of A$2,29 million.

On 19 February 2025, Glencore plc announced the commencement of a new US$1 billion share buyback programme, with the intended completion by the time of the Group’s interim results announcement in August 2025. This week the company repurchased 17,250,000 shares at an average price per share of £2.42 for an aggregate £41,8 million.

In October 2024, Anheuser-Busch InBev announced a US$2 billion share buy-back programme to be executed within the next 12 months which will result in the repurchase of c.31,7 million shares. The shares acquired will be kept as treasury shares to fulfil future share delivery commitments under the group’s stock ownership plans. During the period 31 March to 4 April 2025, the group repurchased 3,600,000 shares for €205,44 million.

Hammerson plc continued with its programme to purchase its ordinary shares up to a maximum consideration of £140 million. The sole purpose of the buyback programme is to reduce the company’s share capital. This week the company repurchased 428,996 shares at an average price per share of 233 pence for an aggregate £996,391.

In line with its share buyback programme announced in March 2024, British American Tobacco plc this week repurchased a further 660,581 shares at an average price of £31.01 per share for an aggregate £20,48 million.

During the period 24 to 28 March 2025, Prosus repurchased a further 7,032,648 Prosus shares for an aggregate €293,83 million and Naspers, a further 512,676 Naspers shares for a total consideration of R2,34 billion.

Three companies issued profit warnings this week: Combined Motor Holdings, Trematon Capital Investments and aReit Prop.

During the week two companies issued cautionary notices: Mustek and Choppies Enterprises.

Who’s doing what this week in the South African M&A space?

0

Choppies Enterprises has disposed of its Zimbabwean business to Pintail Trading, a leading supermarket retailer of groceries and hardware products in the southern region of Zimbabwe. Although the Zimbabwe business is viable in the long-term, Choppies will need to invest more capital to support these operations for extended periods which management believes is not economically viable for the group at this time. Pintail will pay $260,000 for the Zimbabwe business.

The Board of Assura plc, the UK healthcare REIT with an inward listing on the JSE, has accepted an improved offer from Kohlberg Kravis Roberts and Stonepeak Partners for an all-cash deal valuing the company at c.£1,6 billion. Shareholders will receive 48.56 pence for each Assura share and a dividend of 0.84 pence per share due to be paid on 9 April 2025. The offer represents an c.32% premium to the 3-month volume weighted average of the Assura share as of 13 February 2025, the day prior to the commencement of Assura’s offer period. Last week Assura received an offer from Primary Health Properties (PHP) for an all-share combination implying a value c.£1,5 billion which the Board unanimously rejected. The KKR-Stonepeak consortium offer is conditional on shareholder approval.

Cashbuild through its subsidiary Cashbuild Management Services, has acquired a 60% controlling interest in Allbuildco for R93 million. Allbuildco owns three hardware and building material stores trading under the names Amper Alles in Silverlakes, Rayton and Groblersdal. The remaining 40% will be retained by the sellers. The parties have agreed to a series of put and call options exercisable during the next five years which may result in Cashbuild acquiring a further 10% to 40% interest in Allbuidco. The consideration for the options has been capped. The acquisition aligns with Cashbuild’s strategy to become a market leader in the hardware and building material sector in SA across all LSM bands.

Cape-based digital payments gateway Peach Payments has announced the intended acquisition of West-African payment platform PayDunya. The Dakar-based fintech, which was founded in 2015 and operates in six Francophone countries, facilitates sending and receiving payments on websites and mobile applications in addition to the collection and disbursement of bulk payments. The deal marks Peach Payments entry into Francophone Africa following its expansion to Eswatini (2024), Mauritius (2021) and Kenya (2018). In 2023 it closed a US$30 million funding round led by Apis Growth Fund II.

Verified by MonsterInsights