Sunday, November 23, 2025
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Ghost Stories #81: Lesaka Technologies – disrupting through distribution to build a fintech giant

Lesaka Technologies is among the most interesting companies listed on the JSE. With a growth strategy that is grounded firmly in the belief that Southern Africa offers one of the most exciting opportunities in the world today, Lesaka is executing from a tried-and-tested playbook of disruption in the fintech space.

To explain the opportunity and how Lesaka’s business model is built to win, Executive Chairman Ali Mazanderani joined me on this podcast. He brings deep experience in building multi-billion dollar platforms around the world.

In Ali’s own words, “A lot of the best innovation happens with constraint, not with largesse.” Get ready for fantastic insights into building platforms in Africa, with Lesaka as a homegrown example that can be accessed on the JSE. To learn more about Lesaka, you can visit their website here.

This podcast has been sponsored by Lesaka Technologies. As always, I was given an opportunity to dig into the strategy and ask my own questions in my quest to learn more. You must always do your own research and speak to a financial advisor before making any decision to invest. This podcast should not be seen as an investment recommendation or an endorsement.

Listen to the podcast here:

Transcript:

The Finance Ghost: Welcome to this episode of the Ghost Stories podcast. I’m so grateful for what I get to do for a living because I get to meet such interesting people, genuine movers and shakers in the world of business who are growing really impressive platforms and things that are actually making a difference in the economy around us every day. 

Today is certainly no different, with some results hot off the press that you’ll be able to read about in Ghost Bites, although that’s not actually what we’re going to be covering today – I’ll elaborate on that shortly. Today, I’m grateful to be able to welcome Ali Mazanderani. He’s the Executive Chairman of Lesaka Technologies. What an interesting business – big platform play, lots of fintech, lots of attention in this space. 

Ali, thank you so much. I know you are a Ghost Mail reader (which I’m always excited about) and you’ve made time today to come and speak to the Ghost Mail audience about Lesaka’s strategy, which is wonderful. Thank you for being here and I’m so looking forward to this chat with you.

Ali Mazanderani: Thank you very much. It’s a delight to be here.

The Finance Ghost: All right, so let’s jump into it because there’s a lot going on, right? We’ve seen a lot of activity in the fintech space – not just internationally, but on the local market as well. Lesaka was in the press this week for selling down the stake in Cell C. I saw that announcement come out. There’s been a lot of other stuff going on. There’s obviously all the stuff around Bank Zero. 

We’re going to dive into all of this on this podcast to really understand the strategy. That’s what I wanted to get out the way up front, is for the listeners to understand what we’re doing on this podcast. We’re not doing a dive into the latest quarterly numbers. We’re not going to try and unpick note whatever of the financial statements – you can go and do that if you’re interested, I’ll cover that in Ghost Bites

Instead, what we’re doing here is we’re taking advantage of the opportunity to chat to Ali to understand what is actually going on at the group, what the big dreams look like, and so much of the positioning and the themes that are driving this – that’s where I’d like to start. 

Lesaka had an Investor Day earlier this year and I looked at the slides. There was this wonderful statement in there that Southern Africa is among the most attractive fintech opportunities in the world. 

You also said there, Ali, that Southern Africa is positioned to be the next Brazil. Now I’ve looked at your profile. I know you spent some time working in Brazil and you’ve got a lot of experience working in emerging markets. What an exciting thing to be able to say about the place that I’ve always lived in – Southern Africa. I’m very passionate about this region of the world and it’s lovely to hear it spoken of in that way.

What are the conditions about this market that make you feel this way, that get you so excited about the opportunity right here in Southern Africa?

Ali Mazanderani: So I think that there’s plenty of parallels between our region and Brazil. And the markets that Lesaka addresses today are of a similar population. The South African environment is, from an economic perspective, a close corollary of Brazil. It’s just about a quarter or a fifth of the size, depending on the specificity of the area that you’re looking at. 

But the reason why I drew the comparison (and to be honest, the comparison could have been drawn to pretty much any scale emerging market) is because I think a lot of the investor community and a lot of the market analysis that happens in South Africa has missed the context of what’s gone on in the rest of the world. 

My perspective is that, while I cannot always predict the velocity of travel, it’s actually very easy to pick the trajectory because the story has been uniform. Whether that story is in Brazil, Egypt, India, Southeast Asia, or indeed in the United States or the UK. 

I’ll try to summarise it for you. Basically, the dynamic is that the last 20 years has seen a revolution in the digitisation of commerce – a revolution that is still in the very early stages. I think we’re at the beginning of that S-curve. 

And in the Southern African environment, the majority of transactions that happen at point-of-sale are still happening in cash. This is an extraordinary situation to be in, especially in a country that has one of the highest cash-handling costs in the world because of the crime. 

When you look at the dynamics of what has pioneered the digitisation of other countries, it’s typically been from non-traditional fintech participants that may not have existed 20 years ago. Just doing a quick wrap around the world, starting with Brazil as you mentioned – the most valuable company in the financial services industry there is not Itaú or one of the traditional banks – it’s Nubank, an insurgent neobank. And the scale of the non-traditional bank ecosystem there is probably quite close to the size of the banking ecosystem now. 

You have businesses like Bankinter, you have a merchant-acquiring business like StoneCo (which I was a material investor and on the board of for a long time). You have PagSeguro, you have EBANX, you have dLocal – businesses which have created, collectively, more than $100 billion of market value. 

And the story is the same if we go to the UK, where the value of Revolut is more than the value of Barclays, NatWest, or Lloyds. And on the acceptance side, you also have a collection of insurgents – including the business I co-founded in Europe, Teya. But there’s an equivalency whereby the collective market cap of the fintech insurgents is probably close to an equivalency of the traditional banking ecosystem. 

And for those who are skeptical and they say, “Well it can’t happen in, for example, the African environment.” Well in Egypt, Fawry is a business which, probably, only CIB has a larger market cap than now. It’s amongst the largest businesses in Egypt, and again it’s a business that didn’t exist 20 years ago. 

The reason that this dynamic happens here and everywhere, to be honest – if you wanted to bore yourself we could go around almost every country – we could talk about Kazakhstan and Kaspi, or any of the other markets, and then you relay that to the South African environment and you quickly realize that that’s not the case. Even though there’s been quite a lot of noise – quite a lot of conversation (as there should be) around financial innovation here. Even with more high profile businesses (like, for example, the emergence of Lesaka and the recent listing of Optasia), it’s still a tiny fraction of the market cap of the traditional banking markets. As opposed to the sort of 50% that I mentioned there, it’s sort of closer to 1% or 2%. 

And the dynamics that created those changes in the rest of the world were really threefold. The first one was that there was a disruption in the distribution, in different forms. The second one was that the incumbents had legacy technology, which prohibited the ability to engage effectively. And the third one was they had misaligned interests. They were usually protecting existing profit pools. The decision-making power within those organizations was about what was, not about what should be. So, it creates a huge challenge and only the bravest and those with the longest time horizon are capable of reinventing themselves. And those dynamics are prevalent in the South African market. 

If you ask me, “Why has it not happened in South Africa?” I’d say, “Well, it has started to happen.” When I was last living in the country, I was working at FirstRand and almost no volumes at point-of-sale existed outside of the banking ecosystem. Today it’s about 10%. So there is an evolution. There were no fintech businesses of scale. Now there are at least a few, albeit relatively small. 

But I think the reason is the collection of capital, talent and focus – and an enabling regulatory environment. The regulatory environment is improving to create that capability. Capital has historically not looked at South Africa as a growth equity environment. It’s probably been global capital that has been faster to recognise that opportunity than South African capital. And then you need to have a requisite critical mass of capable people exerting their energy and their time against it, but the ingredients are all there.

The train has well and truly left the station, it’s really just a question of how fast it’s going to go.

The Finance Ghost: Oh, there’s so much good stuff in there. That’s such a masterclass in understanding how to assess the growth conditions in emerging markets and also just how disruption happens. I want to touch on a couple of words you mentioned there. 

Fintech insurgents: I love that, it’s absolutely right. You mentioned how they win – distribution disruption, legacy technology – the opportunity to obviously put in place brand spanking new stuff and do things differently. They’re not dealing with these big legacy businesses really, these big behemoths, that they can’t turn around. They can kind of dart around and do some cool stuff. 

And then misaligned interest: That’s such a great point. It is that corporate management thing – “Let me defend my profit pool as I have it today.” 

These are all the conditions that allow startups to come in and actually do really well. The point is how much can those startups scale? And historically that’s been the issue, certainly in the South African market. That’s why our VC industry here is actually so weak compared to what you see overseas – because the potential for loss is there (you know, the losing 30%, 40%, 50% of a fund), but we don’t see much of the “Oh, this could grow into Uber” that they have in the US with the rest of their money. So it’s great to see areas where that is happening, and fintech is clearly one of them. 

You referenced neobanks there – that’s still a term that a lot of South Africans won’t be familiar with. As I understand it, that basically means an online-only bank, right? No physical location.

Ali Mazanderani: No, it could well have physical locations. So I would reference a neobank as being one that has not evolved out of the technology of the 1980s. Usually it’s a business that has an automated onboarding process, but the automated onboarding process does not necessarily mean that there’s not a physical presence. I think this is quite an important distinction, because I don’t believe that the insurgent neobanks of the future (in the African context) are not going to have human touchpoints, and there’s specific conditions associated with that. 

The thing that I would say is that you need to be able to operate at a different level of efficiency from a transaction processing cost perspective in order to succeed. So I’m not sure if there’s a single distinction around a neobank, but by definition I would consider any bank that’s built its technology in the last five to ten years to be one.

The Finance Ghost: Okay, interesting. See, I’m learning all the time here, as is everyone listening to this, which is excellent.

You mentioned earlier that we could bore ourselves talking about all these countries around the world. I think you mentioned Kazakhstan – so interesting. I’ve got a good friend who knows a lot about that market and who looks at it all the time, so there are some voices in South Africa who are looking at these global case studies for disruption, etc. 

I guess everyone in South Africa just reverts to the example of Capitec, who disrupted all of the retail banks and has shown what’s possible – look at what South Africans are willing to pay as a valuation multiple for that business. Again, it shows South African capital might be somewhat risk-averse and quite loss-averse. Given where the country’s been for the last ten years, there’s this general browbeaten feeling among investors of like, “Oh, how big can something get?” But once it proves itself, it’s amazing how the taps just open and then people are very happy to pay big multiples for these kinds of stories. It’s cool to see more and more of this on the JSE.

Ali Mazanderani: I think it’s wonderful and the Capitec story is a fantastic story. There are other fantastic stories of businesses that have been built effectively in South Africa. The one observation I would make, though, is that that’s not a business that disrupted either distribution or technology. That’s a business that operated more efficiently in a sleepy profit pool, so there’s a material distinction – because it’s operating out of a branch network with traditional banking infrastructure, it’s just efficient and effective.

And South African capital markets find it easier to extrapolate from a point. So typically the way that the view of market evolution works is the past is prologue. They don’t find it easy to register a technological inflection point. You may have all the necessary ingredients for a profound change – it may be, on balance of probability, much more likely that change is going to happen than a continuation of a norm – but the way that the mind works is: “This is the way it’s done. Let’s assume it carries on like this, and then let’s consider who’s best positioned in that context.” Rather than, “The rules of the game are about to change. Who’s best positioned to take advantage of that change?”

The Finance Ghost: “Sleepy profit pool” could be my new favorite term. Thank you for bringing that into my life, that is lovely. If you see that in Ghost Mail in years to come, you know where I got it from. Ali, that’s fantastic.

Let’s talk about the Lesaka profit pool then, which is the opposite of a sleepy profit pool. You’re going after, in some respects, a sleepy profit pool, but also just properly disrupting (as you say) – particularly in terms of distribution, which is one of the key ingredients for this.

So as I understand Lesaka Technologies: there’s the merchant division, the consumer division, and then there’s the enterprise division as well, which I think is a fair bit smaller than the others.

I just want to open the floor for you to walk us through the business model – just the very high-level Lesaka story, maybe dig into some of these verticals and why you have them. Give listeners an understanding so that if they wake up in the middle of the night and they need to think about what Lesaka is, they will now understand it going forward, and how it’s actually planning to make the big bucks.

Ali Mazanderani: So the three business units are, as you say, consumer, merchant and enterprise. The consumer business is, in effect, a neobank. We have 2 million active customers and we offer three main products: a transactional account product (so the main account linked to a card that you can use at point-of-sale or withdrawal from ATM), a short-term unsecured lending product, and an insurance product (which, in the Southern African context, is funeral insurance). 

In the merchant business we have five products. Merchant acquiring (this is the acceptance of card at point-of-sale), alternative digital payments (which is the provisioning of prepaid or bill payment-enablement at a point-of-sale – so if somebody wants to buy airtime or pay their traffic fine, as an example), and then the third one would be cash, where we provide vaults that digitise cash for merchants so that they can immediately have access to funds. The fourth one would be software provisioning. We’re one of the largest point-of-sale software players in the hospitality space (that’s basically the software that enables a restaurant or a coffee shop to run itself more effectively). And then the last one would be credit – we also provide merchant credit. 

Then in the enterprise space there are two major products: alternative digital payments and utility payments. I’ll touch on that a bit. 

Our merchant base is about 130,000 and our consumer base is about 2 million. Our enterprise business is in the hundreds of enterprises.

In terms of the specificity of the strategy (both in the consumer and the merchant business), it is the exact same rule book that I explained earlier around what disruptors do. Just to give you some context – I’ve either been a founder of, an investor in, or a material participant in the creation of seven billion-dollar-plus fintech businesses around the world in four continents. So it’s a fairly well traveled playbook that’s been successfully executed on, and I consider this an extension of that (with some local specificity) because markets are not that different – they’re not identical, but they certainly rhyme. 

In the case of those three disruptions, the first thing is we intend to disrupt distribution. And what is distinctive about that? The primary access of our business, both in the consumer business and in the merchant business, is not to have customers come to us. It’s not to say the customer is going to come into a branch or to say a customer is going to go into a retail outlet (which is also a strategy for some of the neobanks). It’s to say we will come to you. 

And, as a business, Lesaka has close to 4,000 employees, of which a material portion (almost half, I expect) are basically field force, engaged in that frontline activity of actually going to the customer. And that allows you to go to the places that others cannot reach. The reason that others don’t typically go there is because they don’t know how to make the unit economics work. And they don’t know how to make the unit economics work because they may not have the technology that allows it to be effective, but also because they try to sell a product. 

What differentiates us in the second degree is we’re not trying to sell a product. We’re trying to sell a collection of relationships. We’re trying to sell a situation in which, while we may be a digitally-first business, we have a human engagement and a human interaction that tries to focus on solving the needs of those customers. 

So let’s take the consumer as an example. A large portion of our consumers do not just have one product with us, right? So they’ll not just be having a transactional account, they’ll also be using us for the lending product. They may also be using us for an insurance product. This allows you (basically) to have differential unit economics – you can defray the costs of that distribution associated with it. 

And, unlike the competitors we have in those markets (people often talk about the competitive intensity) – I don’t think we have a competitor that offers those three products to that segment of customers, which is why (in the segment that we’ve been focusing on in the consumer space) we’re the fastest growing business in the country. 

And I think the performance of our consumer business represents that. It’s a business which, a couple of years ago, was bleeding a lot of money and it’s now a business that is extremely profitable and growing very nicely. You can see the consistency associated with that. And we have a long runway to go around it, because I think we’re only getting started in that segment. 

In the merchant space, the strategy is exactly the same. My intention is not just to sell merchant acquiring as a product and compete with a bunch of different players that are providing that. Most of my customers have more than one product (so, for example, they may well be utilising us for alternative digital payments). And then the ability to utilise the same infrastructure, the same point-of-sale, to do merchant acquiring creates best-in-class unit economics. 

There’s been a lot of talk, for example, around the informal sector and the attractiveness associated with that. But in order to make that market work, it’s not about price. People think that pricing is the principal access – it’s about far more than that. It’s also about creating the use cases for those customers to use a digital store of value in an ecosystem that is predominantly cash. 

So the important thing around our engagement with spaza shops is that we’ll allow them to use the money that they accept on a card payment to either purchase alternative digital products that they can sell to their customers (that is a revenue generating opportunity) or to pay their suppliers to remove cash from that ecosystem. And we have a network of suppliers that we contract with directly so that they don’t have to (if you’re a bread company or a milk company) basically have cash collections on a route in an area where the car is likely to get hijacked at the end of the road – or you’re likely to get cash leakage associated with it. So you’re solving an ecosystem problem. 

And when people make a comparison on the competitor set, well, it depends on what you’re talking about. We have competitors for each of the products we offer, but, as a suite of offering, actually not very much. There is no business that offers that range. There are some that cross two or three of the product offerings that we have. 

Now, in the case of our merchant business, the evolution of putting products together in a single proposition is earlier in the curve than the consumer business. We started on the consumer business close to three years ago, and then on the merchant business, we have bought products and are integrating into that whole, and we still have a little bit of a journey to go. However, I think that the existing configuration of what is there – and those people who are driving for it – is certainly very well-poised for growth. 

We will need to create less complexity around the product brand representation in the market to fully affect this outcome, and that’s a process that we’re going on. So, today our business operates under almost 15 brands. Each of those merchant products has a different brand – the software brand is GAAP, the point-of-sale business in the informal environment is Kazang, the point-of-sale business in the formal environment is Adumo, the cash and credit business has historically been branded as Connect. So there is an evolution there, but the strategic intent is absolutely clear. 

The logic of the enterprise business is basically that I don’t believe in a walled garden. I believe in trying to create a business that is indexed to what is best for society, where my energy and my efforts are not around trying to hold back the flood, but rather to get on the canoe and look forward to it. 

So when we build each of these businesses, we recognise that there are sometimes product dependencies that the market may not have given us the option to utilise. And for both unit economics and also customer experiences reasons, we need to have ourselves. So as an example (and these are typically technology products), I don’t want to have third-party dependencies where I can avoid it in something like transaction switching, which is such a core part of delivering a payments proposition. And that can be for a card payment, but it can also be for electricity and for prepaid stores of value. So our enterprise business basically is the repository of that product.

If (on our consumer app) a customer wants to buy airtime, they can use our enterprise business in order to do so. If, in our merchant environment, a merchant wants to provide the provisioning of prepaid airtime, again – they will be utilising our enterprise business to provide that. But the logic is to say, “Well, why should we just provide that content for our own distribution? Why don’t we make it available to the industry as a whole?” And that’s what we’ve done. 

So we have mobile network operators, retailers, banks, fintechs – all who use our content on alternative digital payments and bill payments and electricity on their own distribution. And they will white-label it. So for example, there’s a pretty good chance, if you are using your banking app to buy electricity or alternative digital payments (prepaid store of value), then the processing behind that may well sit with us. And we do it for the big banks in the country (who in some instances may be considered competitors), for the big retailers in the country, as well as for the telcos. And that allows us then to have a lower cost to serve for our own customers on our own distribution. So that’s the logic of it. 

And that business is now becoming quite relevant in the ecosystem. It’s not one that was visible before, but in the last quarter you would have seen the profitability materially increase and that will continue over the course of this year. 

And there’s one other thing about it that I think is quite important. As a business, we try to focus on the underserved arenas – underserved both in terms of consumers and merchants. And there are certain pockets of financial services that dynamic exists in, and one of them (we think) is electricity. So in addition to providing the transaction switching for that, in addition to providing the ability for consumers and merchants to utilise bill payments there, we also have a metering business where we go all the way down to the customer engagement.

The Finance Ghost: Ali, thanks. That’s a fantastic overview of such an interesting business. I want to ask you a question on each of consumer and merchant, and then I want to chat through some of the acquisitions that Lesaka has recently been up to. 

Let’s do consumer first. So that’s the transactional accounts, the unsecured lending, the insurance products – which, as you quite correctly say, is mainly funeral cover in South Africa. That’s just specifically where the demand is here. So growth flywheels there – obviously quite a few, but one of them as you said is the cross-selling – it’s improving your share of wallet from a particular customer. This improves the lifetime value of a customer, I would imagine, versus your cost of acquiring. 

I find it fascinating that roughly half of your employees are field force – so, getting out there, in-person distribution. Welcome to emerging markets! And in reality, when you look at low income South Africa, it’s almost a frontier market. I imagine it’s not that different to what you see elsewhere in Africa for example. South Africa is very much this tiered society where the needs at different tiers in society are very, very different. Some pieces of it look like the highest income places in the world and others are really comparable to the poorest frontier market. So, that’s super interesting. 

The question I wanted to ask you is: the improving profitability in that space – does that come from unit economics that get better over time? That’s the share-of-wallet point. Does the cost of acquiring get more efficient or is it mainly a scale thing? That you just reach a point where you have enough customers doing enough things that you’ve now covered the costs and are growing. It’s both, right?

Ali Mazanderani: It’s both.

The Finance Ghost: It almost always is, right?

Ali Mazanderani: There is an infrastructural component to what we’re doing – you have to put down the railroad, right? And the cost of putting down the railroad exists independent of how many trains there are. But once you have the railroad in situ, the marginal economics of every additional train that’s going on is going to improve the dynamic, so you have to get above the threshold. 

And one of the things I loved about the positioning of Lesaka was that it’s extremely irregular to have a growth equity insurgent fintech operating firstly with the capital market structure of being in a listed environment almost at birth. Secondly, we’re a business that’s delivered in our adjusted EPS more than 100% last year. We’re expecting to deliver more than 100% this year. So we’re setting ourselves to account for accretive profitable growth at a fairly substantive scale on the underlying – but we’re doing so while we’re very early in the evolution. It’s an interesting thing. It’s not something that I’d be challenged so much for in South Africa, but I was often challenged by people outside of South Africa as to say, “Why? Why are you holding that constraint? Why are you engaging with that?”

Well, firstly, there is a little bit of that expectation in the South African market – and being in a listed environment where multiples typically are adjudicated on an earnings basis, rather than on revenue or GP or other metrics. 

But the second reason outside of that is actually very good discipline. A lot of the best innovation happens with constraint, not with largesse. So you need to have sufficient degrees of freedom (in order to have your sandboxes and to have your moments of innovation), but at the same time, creating some discipline and constraint around the hygiene of those unit economics means you never tread too far from the path.

So yeah, there is huge scale. 

The scale is threefold. The first thing is you’re talking about the operational leverage of a specific business unit in the consumer business. You get that scale when you have more customers on board, when you have more cross-sell – that’s the revenue evolution story. 

But then you also get that scale because, ultimately, the efficiency of the field force representation improves – especially when you get critical mass in a specific node. Then your GP out of your revenue will increase. But then you also have the fixed infrastructure costs of your technology, which would also create the advantages of scale, so basically your technology platform will not require the same cost increase as your revenue. So you get improving GP margins, you get improving EBITDA margins. 

And then as a collective, as a group (and these dynamics are, by the way, the same in the consumer, merchant and enterprise business) we’ve also had to build a central platform. We have a NASDAQ listing, we have group costs associated with that. We have a central infrastructure that could accommodate a business much bigger than the business we’re in. So you’ll get operating leverage in that respect as well. Which is why I have the confidence I have that you can grow revenue at 20%–30%, you can grow EBITDA at 50%, and you can grow EPS at 100% – and you can do that for many years.

The Finance Ghost: Yeah, it’s pretty exciting, right? These are not the numbers that South African investors see very often on our market. And I personally have a great love of the few growth stories that we do have on the local market, of which Lesaka is one, so it’s great to dig in and understand it better. 

The thing I wanted to ask you on the merchant side is something I’ve seen from following the property sector in detail. Specifically the property funds that hold a lot of retail shopping centers – they seem to be doing really well by being relatively near your lower income areas, your commuter routes. It’s that informal-into-formal retail trend.

Now, what’s interesting is that this tells me that consumers are actually getting way more comfortable with transacting – not necessarily digitally because obviously they can transact in cash in those environments- but there’s a formalisation of that environment. And I guess the opportunity for Lesaka is – or one of them at least – is that the informal sector needs to respond to that. They can’t just ignore them, or they risk losing that sort of spaza shop-level business. 

Is that a fair comment? Because I always try to piece together what I’ve learned from different listed companies.

Ali Mazanderani: It’s certainly fair that the trajectory of travel in South Africa is towards digitisation, albeit at a pace that it should accelerate. And I think it’s absolutely fair to say that the arena that has the greatest growth potential is in – I’m going to not use the word informal and formal because I’m not 100% sure what it means – the peri-urban and underserviced areas of the country – because there is a big dislocate between urban city centres or affluent suburbs versus outlying areas. So that is completely true. 

And we do see the product that is growing the fastest (we think the TAM is the biggest associated within those five that we’re talking about in the merchant space) is today our merchant acquiring business, which is the digitisation of card payments at point-of-sale. 

However, things need to happen in the South African market for that to really reach its potential and that’s not going to happen on its own. With PayShap innovation, the market configuration, that’s a different conversation, but what really needs to happen is something else and I think Lesaka is at the forefront of that. 

If you’ll allow me a slight segue, in essence, we don’t have a chicken-and-egg problem on digitisation in South Africa. Almost every adult in this country has an electronic store of value – has a bank account. In our neobanking environment it’s mostly market-share shift, it’s not that somebody enters the arena for the first time. 

We do have a problem with acceptance. Only somewhere (depending on how you want to look at it) between 15% to 20% of merchants actually accept digital payment at the point-of-sale. The consequence of that is that customers have a bank account and more than 50% of deposit flows are withdrawn from an ATM or at a point-of-sale within a short duration of that. And it’s simply because there’s not the acceptance network there. 

But I don’t think you’re going to find the lack of that acceptance network in Sandton. I think what you’re going to find is that lack of acceptance network is in the transport environment – it will be in rural areas, in the local community spaza shop or hairdresser. It will be in a different configuration. The point is, well, who’s filling that gap? 

I think that gap is almost entirely being filled by the non-bank fintech disruptors, because it requires a different distribution strategy and it requires a different technology in order to affect in a cost-sustainable way.

The Finance Ghost: Ali, thanks. I’m learning a lot here about not just the business, but how you kind of view all of this. And I just love reading all these different companies and what they have to say and trying to piece together the story. Especially as someone who’s lived here in South Africa my whole life – such a fascinating country, honestly. 

Let’s move on then into how you are plugging some of the gaps and growing the broader platform and bringing in new things. Because obviously there’s the organic growth story which you’ve spoken to – and there’s a lot of excitement there. You’ve got a lot of flywheels there on how you can just get bigger and better all the time. But like so many growth companies, being open to acquisitions makes a lot of sense, because it takes a lot of time to get certain things off the ground and sometimes it’s better to just buy what someone else has built at the right time, at the right price, right? 

So the one big example is obviously Bank Zero. That’s a transaction that got a lot of attention for you this year. I think let’s maybe get to that after just understanding your broader acquisition strategy. So when you sort of take this top-down view, how do you think about when you should acquire something, when you should allow it to just build over time, and when you start it? And then we can get into Bank Zero as a perfect example.

Ali Mazanderani: So we gave ourselves a hygiene framework around acquisitions that we won’t do – acquisitions that are not going to be accretive. The consideration of accretive is ultimately on an earnings per share basis. So the first thing is it has to fit that framework for us. The second thing is it’s got to work within the strategic evolution that we have set out of building relationships with consumers and merchants by effectively evolving the product offering that we deliver to those. 

And the question as to whether we’d build it ourselves versus buy it is around: “Do we have a business that is available to buy that fulfills the expectations of our customers, where we believe that we will be able to do so in a creative way?” Bank Zero met those expectations and it has product offerings that meet the expectations not just of our consumers, but also of merchants and of enterprises. 

I would say that there was also a lot of familiarity with the team. I was brought up in South Africa and, after coming back from the UK for a period, I worked at FirstRand. So I actually knew Michael and Yatin from then and also as a private equity investor – Michael was the chairman of a business that I was, as a private equity investor, majority shareholder of. So we worked together on what was in effect an African fintech buy-and-build that had a very successful outcome. There was a lot of familiarity in that construct.

One thing I would say as a slight correction of the articulation is I’m not sure that this was a deal in which Lesaka is buying Bank Zero. I actually think if you look at the dynamics of the deal, you could infer it as being one in which Bank Zero shareholders are buying into Lesaka’s story and vision. 90% of the proceeds of this is in equity in Lesaka.

And so really it’s around a recognition of what Lesaka is doing. That’s important because the thesis that I outlined that is so evident from the rest of the world is also evident within leaders in the financial services community in South Africa. It’s not just the Bank Zero team. The Lesaka executive includes a previous co-CEO of Investec plc, leaders within Standard bank and other banking groups in the country. So, in terms of the logic of the transaction for us and for them, it’s a little bit around that distribution conversation or at least the industrial logic. 

So what Bank Zero is – I think it’s the lowest-cost banking platform in the country and it has three things that I love. The first thing I love is, more than any of the others, it owns its own technology. There are degrees to which parties own their own technology, but fundamentally an enormous part of that bank is endogenously developed. The second thing is it’s extremely cost effective to run. I don’t think that there is any other platform that is as cost effective to run. And the third thing is it was evolved over the recent past so it had the ability to choose technology without the constraint of legacy. There’s a very experienced, very capable leadership team there which overwhelmingly came out of the FNB stable and that’s a very exciting place for us to build from. 

One of the challenges that they had is that it’s a fully – in your interpretation of Neobank, right? – digital onboarding, digital-only business that was bootstrapped from the start, so they didn’t take material third party capital. And I do believe that, in the South African environment, there are segments of the population which may engage with that. But for the most part you need a facilitation of human engagement. You can do digital onboarding. You can massively reduce the complexity, the cost, and the friction of onboarding and getting a customer up and running. Today we can issue an account to a customer at the point of engagement, but there are many instances in which human interaction is complementary to the digital process. 

And so what I think we provide for them is distribution not just in the consumer space, but also in the merchant space, which is a key area. So as I mentioned, you have a big salesforce. We have 130,000 merchants. We have 2 million customers. That’s a very attractive proposition, and I think they see the augmentation.

For us, we are not today regulated as a bank. We have an insurance company that is a subsidiary for our insurance business and we have a credit licence, we’ve got TPPP licences. But for our transactional account product, we have to have bank sponsorship, as do we have to have for the merchant acquiring proposition. That creates both dependencies and also cost leakage that we can avoid. 

In addition to that, I don’t think that there’s a clear understanding necessarily from third parties of our balance sheet. We have about R1.5 billion that we lend to merchants and consumers that is predominantly funded from bank lines and equity. Clearly, if we have a bank as a subsidiary of that business and the credit business was sitting within that bank, we would be able to substantively reduce our gross debt.

The Finance Ghost: Yeah, absolutely. There is a very interesting balance sheet play there. I was wondering about – there must be a background relationship. I know you were at FNB and obviously Michael Jordaan was running that thing at a very young age. So I figured that there was going to be some kind of background relationship there. And that makes absolute sense because you’re right – and thank you for pointing that out – it is an equity deal. So it is a big show of belief from the Bank Zero team in the Lesaka story combined with Bank Zero. And that’s an important point.

Michael Jordaan’s got a lot of experience with this stuff. He was involved in the Optasia listing as well. He certainly gets around from a fintech perspective. He’s a busy man. He’s also a Ghost Mail reader, which is quite cool. So he’ll probably listen to this, which is nice. Hello Michael, if you are listening to this!

It’s going to be very interesting to see what happens with this whole Bank Zero story. You’ve touched on so many ingredients there for a good transaction and a good relationship. You’ve spoken to the leadership there, you’ve spoken to the fact that they have their own technology, their own licence. So that theme is definitely coming through in the way you think about this, which is to say I don’t want to be too dependent on third parties. I want to make sure I’m in control of my story and bring that Lesaka distribution to the products effectively that you can bring into the ecosystem. It does make a lot of sense.

Ali Mazanderani: May I just say one thing around the third party dependency? I come at this with an Android, not an Apple mindset. Not a walled garden, an interoperable ecosystem. We want to make available what we have within our proposition – whether it be hopefully our banking business, or it be our enterprise utility bill payment ADP business – we want to make available our products to the market as a whole, to other parties. And I’m very happy also to partner and have third-party relationships. That’s not the consideration.

The consideration is those third-party relationships have to be robust such that we can deliver on our promises to our customers. If you don’t have the right level of support in that ecosystem, both from a technology and from a sustainable economics perspective, then it makes sense to evolve. But I don’t think that any business that has the breadth of ambitions that we have is not going to have a multitude of partnerships in order to be delivering effectively.

It’s just some of the core and critical functional areas – you need to make sure that you can be the change that you need to see.

The Finance Ghost: Yeah, absolutely. If you’re a delivery driver, you want to own your car. You don’t want to rely on Uber arriving every single time you press the button. It’ll arrive 99 times, but there will be that hundredth time when it doesn’t, and then life is going to go very badly for you. So it’s about owning the most important stuff.

I think let’s chat about some of the recent disposals as we start to bring this to a close. One of them was the disposal of MobiKwik that had a bit of a negative impact on the financials in the quarter when it happened and some negative charges.

I think what’s more important is to understand the strategy. You also sold off the Cell C stake as I understand it, based on news hot off the press from Blu Label this week. I’m less interested in the absolute specifics of these things – because it’s more about what you’re building – I’m interested in understanding just how you think high-level about these disposals and the assets you’ve got on the balance sheet.

Were they just clearly non-core? Is it legacy stuff? Just to help people understand where this stuff came from.

Ali Mazanderani: These were all investments – so my engagement with Lesaka started around 2020 with the VCP investment and I joined the board as a non-executive director. In February 2024, I took over as the executive chairman, so my proactive executive responsibility started about 18 months ago. But I had some involvement in the business before.

The business that we invested in and that I joined the board of had a bunch of legacy investments on the balance sheet. The strategy that we set out then was very clear, that we would in an orderly manner – in the manner that was going to hopefully provide the best outcomes for shareholders – divest of everything that was not core to the strategy that we’ve been discussing over the last few months. And to be honest these are two of the last assets in that configuration. There’s really not much else – very small pieces that are left over.

I think it’s helpful because it will remove noise on the balance sheet. What inevitably happens in these things in the case of the MobiKwik business is there was a value that was marked. We exited when the business IPO’d on the Indian Stock exchange and our lockup was over. That crystallised a negative balance sheet outcome. But it had no – I don’t think it had a negative impact on the business. On the contrary, the consequences of that was cash proceeds that could be utilised for our core objectives.

I think in the case of the Cell C business, I hope the IPO goes well, but our core business is not a mobile network operator. I think for us it’s just about trying to ensure that we can deliver fair value for our customers. We don’t know what the outcome of that is going to be because the deal that we signed and that is in the public domain has an underpin, meaning that the pricing registered there, the R50 million in the event of the IPO is a minimum value. It’s not the actual value proceeds – that will be contingent on what happens in the IPO.

The Finance Ghost: Yeah, absolutely. And probably also worth just mentioning that the Bank Zero deal is also going through regulatory approvals, right? It’s not closed yet. It’s still got to go through big regulatory stuff.

Ali Mazanderani: It is not closed yet. It is still going through regulatory approvals. We think that is going well and we have an expectation that it will complete by the end of this financial year. But ultimately, as you say, we are in the hands of regulatory approval.

The Finance Ghost: Fantastic, Ali. Time does fly when we’re having fun and I’ve had a lot of fun on this, so thank you. I think we probably need to close it there because we’ve covered a lot of excellent stuff. Thank you so much for your time today.

To the listeners, I would encourage you to go and do your research obviously on Lesaka. Nothing you’re hearing here is an endorsement from me per se. It’s really just bringing someone like Ali to you to talk about Lesaka and because Lesaka values the Ghost Mail audience and wants you to understand their story.

So go and read, go and read and read and read. You can never read enough. Go and do the research. Go and decide for yourself if Lesaka is something that you are interested in.

Personally, I’m just so excited to see more of these fintech growth stories starting to emerge on the JSE. It really does make our market more interesting and it does feel like it’s been a good year for the JSE. Obviously Lesaka has been on the market for some time, but the point is that the story is really just coming into its own now – scaling, interesting numbers coming out, non-core assets out the way, doing some big transactions.

It’s an exciting time to be you, Ali. Although you’ve done a lot of this in your life, so I guess it probably feels like you’ve been there, done that!

All the best with this. I hope that we’ll be able to do another one of these at some point. I’d love to keep the audience updated on what Lesaka is up to. All the best. And thank you for your time.

Ali Mazanderani: Thank you very much. I enjoyed it. Thanks a lot.

Who’s doing what this week in the South African M&A space?

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African Infrastructure Investment Managers (AIIM), a subsidiary within the Old Mutual Group, is to acquire a 70% stake in Port Elizabeth Cold Storage through its temperature-controlled logistics platform, Commercial Cold Holdings. The investment is funded by AIIM’s African Infrastructure Investment Fund 4 and the IDEAS Managed Fund. The acquisition adds c.15,000 pallet positions to the platform, expanding its national footprint by 10%, and strengthening its position as the largest cold storage platform on the continent. Financial details were not disclosed.

Europa Metals has announced the proposed acquisition of Marula Mining subsidiary Marula Africa Mining and its near-term in production assets in Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi and South Africa in exchange for shares in Europa at a ratio of 9 new shares in Europa for one share in Marula Africa. If the deal is successful, the transaction will constitute a reverse takeover. Europa will need to apply for re-admission of its shares to the AIM market of the London Stock Exchange. The costs of undertaking the proposed deal will be funded by Marula and is expected to generate cash flow and strengthen Europa’s position in the critical minerals sector, aligning with the global demand for electric vehicles and renewable energy materials.

Exxaro Resources has completed the disposal of Exxaro FerroAlloys to a consortium led by EverSeed Energy, through its wholly owned subsidiary EverSeed Metal Powders for a total consideration of R250 million, payable in cash on closing. Post the transaction, the domestic producer of ferrosilicon will be owned by EverSeed (60%), a 100% black-owned investor and operator in the resources and energy sectors, FerroAlloys Management (30%) and the FerroAlloys ESOP (10%). The deal became effective on 31 October 2025.

Transpaco is to acquire Premier Plastics, a manufacturer and supplier of retail plastic carrier bags to major retailers across south Africa, for a cash consideration of R128 million. The facility located in Tshwane produces bags from both virgin and recycled raw materials. Premier owns Polyethylene Recoveries which operates as a recycler of various plastic materials and a supplier of recycled High- and Low-Density Polyethylene polymer raw materials.

In June Kore Potash indicated it needed to find a suitable contract operator solution and a strategic partner with the appropriate potash mining and processing experience. Kore has received non-binding approaches from two parties with the view to exploring the opportunity to acquire an equity stake in the company. Advisers have been appointed though there is no guarantee that a deal will be signed. Shareholders have been cautioned as the company is now considered to be in an offer period.

The Board of Ethos Capital has received a non-binding offer from an unamed South African institution to acquire the residual assets which the offeror values at R626 million, reflecting a discount of 29% to the net asset value (NAV) of these assets of R881 million. Since listing Ethos has received with proceeds of R1,3 billion from the disposal of 15 assets. Over the past three years, with conclusion of the unbundling of the Brait ordinary shares, the Optasia sell down, and the proposed unbundling of the Brait Exchangeable Bonds, Ethos is in a position to return capital to shareholders and wind down the company in the short to medium term. A sale of the residual assets would leave the Optasia stake as the only remaining asset, the stake of which would be monetarised over time after the six-month lock up post the Optasia listing. Shareholders would receive the following proceeds – R4.11 per Ethos share for the Optasia stake plus R0.74 for the unbundled Exchangeable Bonds, cash of R2.45 per share from the disposal of the residual assets and an implied distribution of R1.14 per Ethos share from the proceeds of the Optasia share sale – implying an NAV of R8.44 per Ethos share – a premium to the share price pre-announcement.

Putprop’s 85.27% owned subsidiary Pilot Peridot Investments 1 has concluded an agreement to dispose of a specific portion of land known as Summit Place in Menlyn, Pretoria to Veritas 1000 for an amount of R26,5 million. The proceeds of the disposal will be applied to reduce debt and for investment income-producing properties. The disposal is classified as a Category 2 transaction.

Pepkor has concluded the acquisition of the businesses from Retailability announced in March this year. the Legit, Swagga, Style and Boardmans businesses were acquired for an aggregate R1,7 billion, representing 1.7% of Pepkor’s current market capitalisation.

Weekly corporate finance activity by SA exchange-listed companies

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Visual International has received applications as a result of its bookbuild process for the issue of 85,281,513 shares at a discounted issue price of 2 cents per share. The R1,71 million raised will be used to assist with the company’s working capital requirements.

Last week Africa Bitcoin announced the results of its capital raise, placing 368,598 ordinary shares at an issue price of R11.00 raising R4,05 million. The funds have been used in part to fund the acquisition of 1.5000 BTC for an aggregate cash consideration of R2,77 million. The company now holds 2,51164 BTC with an aggregate acquisition value of R4,59 million.

In terms of its Dividend Reinvestment Plan (DRIP) Hammerson has, on behalf of shareholders electing this option, purchased 156,713 shares in the market at an average price of £2.98 per share and 144,346 shares in the local market at an average price of R69.49 per share.

Further details on the proposed listing of Cell C were released. The listing will be accompanied by an offer to qualified investors by way of a private placement of existing shares by The Prepaid Company (TPC), a subsidiary of Cell C’s largest shareholder Blu Label Unlimited, to raise R7,7 billion. This includes a R500 million overallotment option. Up to R2,4 billion worth of shares will be allocated to a black empowerment vehicle. Following the flip-up, TPC will transfer shares to Cell C executives resulting in management collectively holding 4.5% of the company. The proceeds raised will be allocated towards settling certain of TPC’s interest-bearing borrowings and other debt obligations. The offer and listing will provide Cell C with access to capital markets, to support and develop further growth of the company and to finance acquisitions and investments in businesses, technologies, services, products, software, intellectual property rights, spectrum and other assets.

Suspended Wesizwe Platinum has advised that the publication of the interim financial statements for the six months ended 30 June 2025 has been deferred. The delay arises from the late finalisation of the annual financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2024, released in September, which was impacted by the reported cyber breach. The company expects the release of its interims by 31 January 2026.

On 19 February 2025, Glencore announced the commencement of a new US$1 billion share buyback programme, with the intended completion by the time of the Group’s interim results announcement in August 2025. This week the company repurchased 7,200,000 shares at an average price per share of £3.62 for an aggregate £26,05 million.

South32 continued with its US$200 million repurchase programme announced in August 2024. The shares will be repurchased over the period 12 September 2025 to 11 September 2026. This week 354,085 shares were repurchased for an aggregate cost of A$1,12 million.

The purpose of Bytes Technology’s share repurchase programme, of up to a maximum aggregate consideration of £25 million, is to reduce Bytes’ share capital. This week 215,400 shares were repurchased at an average price per share of £3.69 for an aggregate £795,686.

In May 2025, British American Tobacco extended its share buyback programme by a further £200 million, taking the total amount to be repurchased by 31 December 2025 to £1,1 billion. The extended programme is being funded using the net proceeds of the block trade of shares in ITC to institutional investors. This week the company repurchased a further 592,853 shares at an average price of £39.95 per share for an aggregate £23,62 million.

During the period 27 to 31 October 2025, Prosus repurchased a further 1,017,081 Prosus shares for an aggregate €61,83 million and Naspers, a further 377,261 Naspers shares for a total consideration of R475,58 million.

Two companies issued a profit warning this week: Oceana and enX.

Five companies issued or withdrew a cautionary notice: ISA Holdings, EPE Capital, ArcelorMittal South Africa, Kore Potash and Sable Exploration and Mining.

Who’s doing what in the African M&A and debt financing space?

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Anda, an Angolan company focused on inclusive and sustainable urban mobility, has successfully closed a €3 million funding round that included BREEGA, Speedinvest, Double Feather Partners, and 4DX Ventures — with investors from France, Austria, Japan, and the United States.

BIO – the Belgian Investment Company for Developing Countries has announced the close of an investment in LIMBUA. Financial terms were not announced. LIMBUA is a German-Kenyan macadamia nuts supplier and producer. In cooperation with more than 9,000 Kenyan smallholders, they produce macadamia nuts, macadamia oil, avocado oil and dried mangos for the trade.

African Development Bank has approved a US$14,54 million financing package to support the Garneton North 20 megawatt solar project, in Zambia’s Copperbelt Province. When operational, the project will provide 82,000 people with clean, reliable electricity and eliminate 58,740 tons of CO2 emissions per annum.

ElectriFI, the EU-funded Electrification Financing Initiative managed by EDFI Management Company, has announced a €2,5 million equity investment in Sawa Energy, a growing renewable energy company operating in Uganda and Rwanda. The investment, allocated through the Uganda Country Window of ElectriFI, aims to catalyse the expansion of solar photovoltaic and Backup Energy Storage Solutions for commercial and industrial clients across Uganda.

In Boucraa, Morocco, Phosboucraa which mines, processes and markets phosphate rock and, soon customised fertilizers, has announced it has raised MAD2 billion in financing from Caisse de Dépôt et de Gastion to support the company’s investment programme in the Southern Provinces.

WildyNess, a Tunisian B2B2C traveltech startup, closed its pre-seed round co-led by Bridging Angels and the African Diaspora Network for an undisclosed value. Founded by engineers Achraf Aouadi and Rym Bourguiba, WildyNess uses its B2B2C model to empower tourism micro-entrepreneurs. The raised capital will be used to fuel regional expansion into Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the UAE, as well as to strengthen its technology platform.

Farm to Feed, a Kenyan agritech startup that connects smallholder farmers to businesses that need reliable and traceable produce, has closed a US$1,5 million seed funding round to scale its operations across Kenya and into regional markets in Africa. The investment includes $1,27 million in equity and $230,000 in non-dilutive funding from the DeveloPPP Ventures programme. The $1,27 million equity round was led by Delta40 Venture Studio, with participation from DRK Foundation, Catalyst Fund, Holocene, Marula Square, 54Co, Levare Ventures, and Mercy Corps Ventures.

Beltone Venture Capital has announced its exit from Cathedis, a Moroccan logistics and last-mile e-commerce delivery company that provides services like pickup, warehousing, and delivery for online retailers. The exit saw Beltone achieve a 100% IRR, marking its third successful exit since inception in 2023.

Chari, a Moroccan B2B e-commerce startup, has raised an undisclosed amount from DisrupTech Ventures, an Egypt-based early-stage venture capital firm, as part of its Series A extension round. Chari allows traditional store owners to order and receive fast-moving consumer goods directly from distributors. The YC–backed company has onboarded more than 20,000 small retailers across Morocco, Tunisia, and Côte d’Ivoire.

Europa Metals announced the signing of a heads of terms regarding the proposed acquisition of Marula Africa Mining Holdings and its near-term in production assets in Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi and South Africa in exchange for shares in Europa at a ratio of 9 new shares in Europa for one share in Marula Africa.

The Public Interest puzzle: South Africa’s merger control balancing act

South Africa’s competition law regime has never confined itself to market dynamics alone. Since its inception, the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (as amended) (the Act) has recognised that market outcomes cannot be divorced from the country’s historical realities and developmental priorities. In line with this, South Africa’s merger control framework has long since integrated a transformational public interest approach – placing it amongst a small group of jurisdictions globally to do so.

Yet, as the country sharpens its focus on transformation – with the Competition Commission of South Africa’s (the Commission) latest iteration of their Revised Public Interest Guidelines Relating to Merger Control, published in March of 2024 (the Revised Public Interest Guidelines), codifying a more proactive enforcement stance – the spotlight intensifies on the balancing act required. Whilst laudable in intent, there is a growing debate as to whether the evolving public interest regime may inadvertently chill investment and hinder economic growth – particularly where legal certainty and global competitiveness are at stake.

Merger control in South Africa is governed by a two-limbed test under section 12A of the Act:

  1. Competition assessment: Will the merger substantially prevent or lessen competition in any market?
  2. Public Interest assessment: Regardless of the competition assessment outcome, can the merger be justified on substantial public interest grounds?

A 2019 amendment to the Act, through the insertion of section 12A(1A), reconfigured the assessment to be performed by the Commission – clarifying that these limbs are not hierarchical in nature, but rather, parallel. Thus, a merger that raises no competition concerns may still be prohibited or heavily conditioned if it poses a substantial public interest risk.

If a particular transaction does not pose any competitive or economic risks to any market – but may have a substantially adverse effect on public interest in the country, it may make sense for such a transaction to be prohibited – or at least have conditions imposed that are ameliorative to the negative effects caused. However, the Commission’s interpretation of what constitutes a ‘substantial public interest ground’ is where the dissention lies.

While the Revised Public Interest Guidelines deal with each of the individual public interest grounds listed under section 12A(3) of the Act – the most notable interpretive expansion pertains to the Commission’s evaluation of section 12A(3)(e), which refers to the promotion of a greater spread of ownership, particularly regarding the increase of the levels of ownership by historically disadvantaged persons (HDP) and workers in firms in the market.

In this regard, the Commission has unequivocally stated that it views this provision as a strictly positive obligation – meaning that every notifiable merger, regardless of size or structure, is expected to contribute to ownership transformation. This marks a fundamental shift from the previous approach, where HDP ownership dilution was only assessed if it was merger-specific and material.

For instance, under the Revised Public Interest Guidelines, a proposed transaction could pose no competition risks, have a positive effect on employment, and result in various pro-competitive market efficiencies. However, if the proposed transaction does not bring about an actual accretion of HDP ownership, the Commission will view this as a substantial public interest ground and call for the imposition of corrective merger conditions to curtail the perceived negative effect of the transaction – and even, the possible prohibition of the merger. This would apply even in circumstances where a proposed transaction has a completely neutral effect on HDP ownership levels.

Further, in a more recent development, the Commission appears to have adopted a revised public interest stance concerning retrenchments. In the event that any retrenchments take place within a 24-month window prior to a transaction, the Commission will consider these retrenchments as merger-specific and treat them as if they form part of the proposed transaction. This approach stems from two recent matters which were heard before the Competition Tribunal: Amandlamanzi Resources // Mylotex [Case No. LM144JAN25] and Novus Holdings // Mustek [Case No. LM145JAN25].

Once again, this places a heightened burden on the merger parties when vying for a transaction’s approval, as the Commission will adhere to the view outlined above even in circumstances where the retrenchments took place before the proposed transaction was even contemplated.

The rationale for prioritising ownership transformation and employment stability is clear: South Africa faces staggering inequality and unemployment, which markets alone have failed to address. But as public interest considerations gain prominence in merger control, concerns about legal certainty and investment sentiment are mounting.

Foreign investors, particularly those accustomed to purely competition-based merger reviews, may be deterred by the prospect of post-approval ownership restructuring, protracted negotiations with regulators, and the imposition of burdensome merger conditions that render transactions economically unviable.

This is a particular concern with large, multi-jurisdictional deals where the South African merger approval process threatens to scupper the entire global transaction. Under these circumstances, international firms often consider ringfencing the country so that it is excluded from the deal, or in some cases, complete local divestiture. The net effect of this is that South Africa is excluded from the global economy and does not get to benefit from the potential investment and economic growth opportunities that these kinds of transactions often bring.

So, the very laws and regulations that have been adopted for the purpose of growing and bolstering our economy can very easily have the exact opposite effect.

However, there is no doubt that competition law in South Africa must serve more than just economic efficiency. The Act is a product of its time and place, and any credible regulatory regime must reckon with the context in which it operates.
Typically, where a transaction raises a specific competition or public interest concern, the Commission will try to impose a set of merger conditions that are directly responsive to the identified issue. For instance, if a transaction is likely to result in a duplication of roles for the target entity post-merger, the Commission will likely require the merger parties to agree to a retrenchment moratorium.

The same principle applies where a transaction does not give rise to an increase in HDP ownership levels, as the Commission will likely push for the establishment of an employee share ownership plan, or the introduction of an HDP shareholder for the transaction to be approved.

However, there has been a recent shift in the market, whereby the competition authorities seem more acquiescent to accept merger conditions that do not directly correlate with the perceived negative effects of the transaction. Under these circumstances, the Commission may be willing to accept the establishment of an employee training programme to ameliorate for a possible retrenchment concern – or a commitment to increase the levels of procurement from HDP-owned and controlled firms to offset a potential decrease in HDP ownership levels. The guiding factor under these circumstances is generally that the commitment being made should carry an equal weight to the directly responsive remedy that the merger parties were unable or unwilling to carry out for whatever reason.

While this shift seems to signal a more flexible approach by the South African competition authorities, indicating a potential win for business and merger activity – there is a risk that this process could be viewed as the merger parties merely ‘buying’ their merger approval – given that the actual identified regulatory risks and concerns are not being addressed by the merger conditions. This scenario would be akin to the touted introduction of Elon Musk’s Starlink and its possible circumvention of the relevant HDP ownership requirements in exchange for extensive investment commitments.

Overall, South Africa’s merger control regime stands at a crossroads. And while public interest should not be viewed as a side issue, for the system to truly deliver on its transformative promise, it must strike a careful balance: promoting inclusion without dampening growth, and enforcing equity without undermining competitiveness.

Too much emphasis on social outcomes, without regard for commercial realities, may undermine the very goals the regime seeks to advance. But too little attention to public interest would be a dereliction of the country’s constitutional commitments.

Nicholas De Decker is an Associate | Lawtons Africa

This article first appeared in DealMakers, SA’s quarterly M&A publication.

Buy the world, without the bumps

Advanced Investment Holdings Ltd is a structured product promoted by Investec that offers diversified international equity exposure, plus capital protection. This could be a smart option when markets appear to be expensive.

Despite the lows and blows of the global news headlines, major world stock indices and commodities have been setting and surpassing new records in 2025. The rolling records and milestone numbers, however, can be a conundrum for new entrants and buyers.

With huge swathes of the investment landscape feeling relatively expensive, finding the right entry point can prove tricky. Structured products with capital protection and degrees of outcome predictability could strike the right balance.

Riding the waves

In October, gold traded above $4000/ounce for the first time, finding $4,300 mid-month before retreating, and the FTSE 100 traded in record territory, surpassing successive “all-time highs”. Stateside, the S&P has weathered tariff-induced dives (April) and poor labour data (July and August) and still came out swinging in September and October, showing weekly gains in four of five consecutive weeks and taking 2025’s tally of record high days to 37 so far.

As CNN breathlessly reported (in September), the S&P 500 “soared nearly 30% since its low point in April”, trading at 3.25 times sales on August 12, making for the highest level ever for that metric. The Buffett Indicator, CNN pointed out, was at 217%, “a historically high level that signals the stock market might be strongly overvalued”. It has since clocked in at 225%. Exact numbers aside – as the records stack up – the article provides a rundown of potential “overvaluation” signals, cautioning against not just the relative expense of the market but also increased sensitivity to shifts in sentiment.

Faced with this kind of market, some investors will be questioning how to proceed: Sitting it out means missed time in the market, while buying “too high” can mean a bracing bump at the bottom end of a trough.

The safety of structure

Structured product offerings provide for buyers seeking exposure to the high potential returns of the international equity market, without the downside equity risk, thanks to built-in capital protection. Plus, a range of other benefits as below.

Advanced Investment Holdings Ltd (AIHL) is an example of a structured product offering. AIHL is in the form of a listed, Guernsey-incorporated company that has Investec as its investment adviser. Investors subscribe for shares in the company, fully externalising the investment in USD. With the funds raised from the issue of shares, the company buys financial instruments that create a structured product payoff profile for investors. The financial instruments are issued by large international banks, which means that South Africans can further diversify their SA risk.

In this case, an investment in AIHL provides exposure to the growth of a broad-based basket of equity indices[1]. AIHL will return the growth of the index basket multiplied by a participation rate of 125%[2]. The index basket growth is capped at 40% – for a maximum return of 50% in USD (i.e., 40% x 125%). The term of the investment is five years and one month, with the potential to exit the investment early under normal market conditions.

Strategies for risk management

With 100% capital protection[3] at maturity in USD, this offering reduces the downside risk of future equity market shocks. Instead of traditional equity market risk, it provides a more predictable outcome between a “floor and ceiling”.

AIHL achieves capital protection through purchasing a debt instrument, which will accrue interest over time until it matures at 100% of the company’s capital. The debt instrument is a credit-linked note where the issuer and credit reference entities are large international banks with investment-grade credit ratings. The payout from the debt instrument at maturity is used to return the company’s capital, regardless of the movements of the equity market. However, the company’s capital is at risk if there is a default or credit event, in which case the full value of the debt instrument will not be paid out at maturity.

While risk cannot be avoided, this offering allows investors to reduce downside equity risk by taking on additional credit risk, which can be perceived as less risky.

A portfolio view

This offering is positioned to provide diversified global equity exposure within a portfolio, of particular interest for investors with mid-range horizons taking a buy-and-hold approach rather than one of, say, attempting to time the markets. Furthermore, as a dollar-denominated instrument, South Africans who anticipate rand depreciation on the horizon could see potential further upside should they convert their USD investment back into rands.

For more information, visit our website. Applications close on 28 November 2025 with a minimum investment amount of USD 12,000.

You can also refer to the recent podcast with The Finance Ghost and Japie Lubbe of Investec Structured Products, available below and with the full transcript here.

Please ensure that you do your own research and speak to your financial advisor. This sponsored article (and the related podcast) should not be seen as an endorsement or investment recommendation by The Finance Ghost, but rather a tool to assist in your research process.


[1] S&P 500 (35% weighting), Euro Stoxx 50 (35% weighting), Nikkei 225 (20% weighting), FTSE 100 (10% weighting)

[2] The participation is dependent on market conditions on trade date (the current participation is 125%). Advanced Investment Holdings Ltd reserves the right to trade a minimum participation of 115% if required due to market conditions on trade date.

[3] Structured products provide capital protection through the assumption of credit risk. They are intended for sophisticated investors who understand this risk and are willing to take it. There is credit risk on the debt issuer, each reference entity (the credit risk relates to the subordinated debt issued by such reference entities), and the equity investment provider(s). A default by any such party(ies) may cause the value of such investment of the company to be reduced or to become zero, which may adversely affect the share price or cause the share to become worthless.

Disclaimer available here.

Ghost Bites (African Rainbow Minerals | Blu Label – Cell C | Gold Fields | Vodacom)

African Rainbow Minerals places Beeshoek Iron Ore Mine on care and maintenance (JSE: ARI)

The mine is a casualty of the mess that is ArcelorMittal (JSE: ACL)

Just this week, I noted that ArcelorMittal is fighting with the unions regarding the loss of jobs at the Longs business in Newcastle. The Labour Court ruled in favour of the unions, despite ArcelorMittal having carried this loss-making facility for the longest time.

When a business (or a major segment) fails, it takes others down with it. Sure enough, African Rainbow Minerals announced that the Beeshoek Iron Ore Mine has been placed on care and maintenance as this mine’s sole customer is ArcelorMittal. The infrastructure is old and the mine is only viable based on the offtake agreement with ArcelorMittal. Offtake has been reduced over the past five years and the supply agreement expired in June 2024, becoming a month-to-month deal. Deliveries ceased at the end of July and all efforts to find an alternative for the mine were unsuccessful.

This means that 622 workers will be retrenched with effect from 30 November 2025. African Rainbow Minerals has put various support programmes in place to try and mitigate the pain. It’s always very sad when this happens, but it does a lot of damage to the economy if unions step in at this point and make the losses even worse. All this does is make it harder for companies to justify the risk of expansion and job creation.


Cell C takes a big step closer to being separately listed on the JSE (JSE: CCD)

This is of course highly relevant to investors in Blu Label (JSE: BLU)

I really look forward to the day when we can read about Cell C’s results and strategy without having to wade through endless transaction steps and complexities. That day draws ever closer thankfully, with two very important announcements in the market on Wednesday.

I’ll start with the most interesting one: Cell C has announced its intention to list on the main board of the JSE. We knew that this day was coming of course, as Cell C has been on roadshows for a while and Blu Label has been putting tons of effort into getting it ready for listing. Still, seeing the official announcement is exciting. We might be losing listings at an alarming rate on the market, but at least some new ones are coming through as well.

Cell C in its current form is a profitable and interesting business. The capex-light strategy focuses on being the shovel in the gold rush when it comes to companies with strong distribution (banks, retailers etc.) wanting to sell telecoms-related services and earn a margin-enhancing fee in the process. Capitec Connect is a perfect example of this, operating as a mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) using Cell C’s infrastructure.

Cell C has 13 of the 23 MVNOs in South Africa on its platform, so they have a majority market share. Although this segment gets all the attention, there’s still the consumer-focused segment that has 7.8 million mobile subscribers. My understanding of the numbers is that Cell C makes 42.1% of revenue from prepaid and 15.3% from postpaid. This means that more than half the revenue is sourced from the traditional offering, while the rest comes from wholesale and B2B, enterprise, fibre to the home, roaming and equipment. The group is much more diversified than the PR efforts around the MVNO business would otherwise suggest.

For the year ended May 2025, Cell C generated revenue of R13.7 billion and EBITDA of R3.7 billion. Given the financial complexities of how the group has been structured, those are pro forma numbers with footnotes (i.e. net of many adjustments). Still, it’s the best view they can provide of the current economics once all the restructuring steps are completed. Importantly, capex intensity (the percentage of revenue invested in capex) on a pro forma basis was 5.7% for that period, a number far below what would be required for Cell C to try and build out a competing network vs. buying excess network capacity from the leaders in the telecoms market. This speaks to their capex-light model of being the switch rather than the tower.

One of the strategic pillars that they put forward at Cell C has the bold aim of “driving an infectious brand connection” – a creative PR person came up with that! The brand may be infectious, but the web of restructuring transactions will simply make you sick. Blu Label has had some of the most complicated financial reporting I’ve ever seen. This will thankfully all be sorted out as part of the listing prep, which means that Cell C will be cut loose with a clean balance sheet.

The pre-listing steps will result in TPC (the Blu Label subsidiary) having a significant majority of shares in Cell C, while Cell C’s management will have 4.5%. The listing itself will see TPC sell up to R7.7 billion in shares in Cell C, with around R2.4 billion earmarked for an empowerment vehicle and the remaining R5.3 billion for the broader market. Blu Label will use the proceeds to settle debt and improve its balance sheet, with a portion of the proceeds potentially being paid as a dividend to shareholders.

It’s important to understand that Cell C will not be receiving any of those listing proceeds. Given the capex-light nature of the model, that makes sense.

For all the excitement, I must note that Cell C is only expecting single-digit revenue growth in years to come. They operate at decent margins and they expect to pay 30% to 50% of free cash flow as a dividend, so this is more of a dependable story than a high-risk growth story. If you’re looking for a position further along the risk/reward curve in this sector, then MTN (JSE: MTN) and Vodacom (JSE: VOD) with their forays into Africa would probably be more interesting. This isn’t to say that Cell C isn’t without risk of course!

In a separate announcement, Blu Label announced a few other pre-listing transactions. For example, TPC will acquire a loan claim that Nedbank (JSE: NED) has against Cell C for R447 million, with the plan being to convert it to equity. TPC has also agreed to acquire Nedbank’s 7.53% stake in Cell C, as well as the stake that Lesaka Technologies (JSE: LSK) holds in Cell C (5.13%). There is also an agreement to settle lease claims worth R1.3 billion for R750 million. With all said and done, the pro forma gross debt in Cell C is R2.75 billion, a gross debt to EBITDA ratio of 0.8x.

I can’t find exact confirmation of the listing date in the announcement, but I suspect it will happen before the December break.


Gold Fields: production up, costs down and guidance affirmed (JSE: GFI)

This is what the people want to see

Gold Fields released an operational update for the quarter ended September. It’s filled with good news, like a 6% increase in production and a 10% drop in all-in sustaining costs (AISC) per ounce, both measured on a quarter-on-quarter basis. At a time when gold is doing so well, all that investors hope for is that the gold miners will respond with efficient production.

If we look at year-on-year numbers, production was up 22% and AISC per ounce declined by 8%. That’s excellent.

The group ended the quarter with an extremely healthy balance sheet, with net debt to EBITDA at 0.17x vs. 0.37x in Q2. During the quarter, net debt managed to almost halve from $1.49 billion to $791 million. This was necessary as the post-quarter activity saw the completion of the acquisition of Gold Road Resources for $1.45 billion net of cash received and other adjustments. With all said and done, net debt to EBITDA is currently at 1.0x.

Guidance for FY25 has been affirmed. The share price is up 168% this year, although it’s nearly 19% off the 52-week high based on the recent correction in the gold price.


Vodacom has settled the Please Call Me matter (JSE: VOD)

I’m glad this crazy situation has come to an end

Personally, I’m tired of reading about the Please Call Me claim that Kenneth Makate has been fighting to get from Vodacom. All sense of commerciality appears to fly out the window in the debates around this matter, with truly eyewatering numbers as the suggested settlement figure for the dispute. It’s very much become a David vs. Goliath thing in South Africa, without people thinking about the knock-on effects of a huge number changing hands.

We don’t know yet what the final number is, but we do know that Vodacom and Makate have finally settled out of court for an undisclosed sum. We should be able to see it when Vodacom releases their interim results for the six months to September 2025. Given the strong recent performance at Vodacom, they may have used the opportunity to get this out the way and take the financial knock in a period that can “afford” it.

This battle has been going on for 17 years. That’s only slightly less time than the iPhone has existed for!


Nibbles:

  • Director dealings:
    • An associate of a director of Afrimat (JSE: AFT) sold shares worth just under R500k.
    • As we’ve seen many times, the CEO of Spear REIT (JSE: SEA) bought shares for his minor children and family investment vehicles. This time around, the purchases came to over R90k in aggregate.
    • The CEO of Vunani (JSE: VUN) bought shares worth R8k.
  • UK subsidiary of ASP Isotopes (JSE: ASP), Quantum Leap Energy, is working towards producing High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU) in the UK. The update is that early engagement for “regulatory pathways” has been formally commenced. If this sounds like a regulatory minefield, you’re on the right track. This sector is obviously at the top of the list from a national security perspective, so a detailed due diligence is part of the process. The company also announced the appointment of highly experienced civil and defence sector executive Rich Deakin to the role of Managing Director, UK Strategic Projects. They seem to be making a lot of progress at ASP Isotopes on both sides of the Atlantic.
  • I may not love the approach being taken at Africa Bitcoin Corporation (JSE: BAC), but that’s not what counts. Instead, what counts is that the company consistently sticks to the strategy that has been put forward, so that those who believe in it can feel confident about its execution. Having raised my concern about less than half of the recent capital raising proceeds being used to acquire bitcoin, I’m pleased to see that another R900k or so was used to acquire half a bitcoin. This takes their total holding to just over 2.5 bitcoin, with a total acquisition value of nearly R4.6 million. But what about the rest of the proceeds?
  • Interestingly, Attacq (JSE: ATT) has withdrawn the AGM resolution related to the general authority to issue shares for cash. Companies tend to ask for this permission as a matter of course each year. A potential reason for it being withdrawn could be that major shareholders may have indicated to Attacq that they won’t vote in favour for the resolution while there is now uncertainty over who the next CFO will be. I’m genuinely just speculating though – there could be other reasons. It’s just unusual to see a withdrawn resolution.
  • Datatec (JSE: DTC) has sent the circular to shareholders dealing with the scrip distribution alternative. The cash dividend is 175 cents per share. The scrip dividend will be calculated based on this price and the 30-day VWAP adjusted for the cash dividend, less 10%. The exact ratio will be announced on 24 November.
  • Wesizwe Platinum (JSE: WEZ) remains suspended from trading, with the company hoping to release the interim results for the six months to June by the end of January 2026. The company is still dealing with the hangover of the cyber breach that feels like it happened ages ago.

Ghost Bites (Africa Bitcoin Corporation | Alphamin | ArcelorMittal | enX | Kore Potash | Pepkor)

Africa Bitcoin Corporation bought one bitcoin (JSE: BAN)

Which takes their tally to two bitcoin…

I try hard to have an open mind – not just when it comes to finance, but in life in general. I’m not a traditional crypto guy and I never will be, but I’ve heard decent arguments from very smart people in favour of adding bitcoin exposure over time. Each to their own.

From a corporate strategy perspective though, I still don’t understand the decision to pivot from Altvest to Africa Bitcoin Corporation. I raised my doubts at the time about the local market acceptance. The subsequent capital raise unfortunately proved me right, as they only raised a few million bucks towards this big dream. In public market terms, that’s tiny. To give you context, you would need to raise more money to open a Spur than they managed to raise in the public market to buy bitcoin.

Using part of the proceeds from the capital raise of R4.05 million, they’ve deployed R1.87 million to buy one bitcoin. This means they now own 2.0116 bitcoin at a total in-price of R3.69 million. I’m never going to be convinced that this is a better use of management time and effort than just focusing on delivering on the promises of the Altvest Credit Opportunities Fund (ACOF).

I’m not sure why the remaining R2.2 million or so from the capital raise wasn’t deployed. They talk about retaining cash on hand for further bitcoin deployment, so does that mean they don’t like the current pricing? And if so, why did they buy the first one? Are they actively looking to trade bitcoin, or are they looking to build a reserve over time, in which case they should’ve deployed as much as possible into bitcoin? There are more questions than answers here.

The company has also now started reporting BTC Yield, which measures the change in the number of bitcoin per share in issue over a period of time. This metric is used by Michael Saylor’s Strategy, the global bitcoin treasury company that everyone points to as the best example of this approach. I personally find the word “yield” to be misleading though. Just call it what it is: the change in the NAV per share that is related to bitcoin.


Alphamin released detailed Q3 financials that reflect a much better quarter (JSE: APH)

You just have to be careful of the disruption in the prior quarter

Alphamin releases detailed operational updates long before they actually file their financials for the quarter, so the main details of the recent performance were already known to the market a month ago. Still, it’s worth recapping the highlights now that detailed financials are available for the quarter ended September.

Contained tin production in Q3 was up 26% vs. Q2 (i.e. sequentially, not year-on-year) and this led to an increase in guidance for full-year production. EBITDA jumped by a juicy 28% vs. Q2 thanks to not just a 12% increase in tin sales, but also a 4% improvement in the average tin price achieved and a 2% decrease in the cost per tonne.

Alphamin’s operations were impacted by a production halt in the second quarter, so don’t extrapolate these sequential growth rates into the future. Security risks in the DRC remain top of mind for the company and its investors, with the share price having had a wildly volatile year:

If you have a fetish for trading DRC security risks, then you’ll want to add this one to your watchlist. For those with low risk tolerance, it’s probably better to look elsewhere. Mining in Africa is very far along the risk/reward curve and certainly isn’t for everyone.


ArcelorMittal is fighting the unions (JSE: ACL)

Everything that makes South Africa a tough place to do business is on full display here

ArcelorMittal’s problems have been highlighted for a long time now. The company has carried losses at the Longs business for ages, with government getting involved to try and find some kind of solution. No such solution has been found, which means that the company has little choice but to put the Longs business into care and maintenance. This is a disaster for places like Newcastle, but ArcelorMittal is out of options as they are a for-profit company that cannot carry huge losses forever.

Of course, being the highly unionised country that we are, NUMSA challenged the Section 189 process concluded in March 2025 and the Labour Court found in their favour. This means that ArcelorMittal has to reinstate all the employees who were dismissed, and they can’t undertake further dismissals, despite going through a detailed process to try and find an economic solution for these assets that wasn’t forthcoming from either the private or public sector.

I feel very sorry for the workers involved here, but this business is going to fail for reasons that are mostly outside of its control. That’s how things work in a country with low growth and deteriorating infrastructure. If that makes you angry, direct that anger at government where it belongs.


enX really misses load shedding (JSE: ENX)

An entire industry was left for dead by Eskom’s sudden improvement

Much like memories of COVID lockdowns, load shedding is starting to feel like an out-of-body experience; a thing that happened to somebody else. It’s hard to think back to what life was like when we didn’t have electricity for half the day. Things truly were darkest before the dawn!

It wouldn’t be accurate to say that nobody misses load shedding, as there were a lot of businesses built to address the desperate needs of South Africans for backup power. Although an element of that demand remains, it’s certainly nowhere near what it used to be. This is the problem when a business is built to address a single problem. In this case, the “disruption” to the industry was something as simple as Eskom keeping the lights on!

This is why enX’s continuing operations, primarily the Power segment, are suffering. In a trading statement for the year ended August 2025, the company noted a drop in revenue from continuing operations of 32%. Profit before tax will be down by between 30% and 34%. To add insult to injury, the lack of load shedding was accompanied by a delay in large-scale data centre projects and the payment of R15 million related to the IDC calling on a guarantee. On a per-share basis, HEPS from continuing operations will be between -3 cents and +1 cent, which is at least much better than the restated prior period loss of -8 cents.

In the discontinued operations, we find the disposal of the Lubricants segment that was effective in March 2025. We also find the Chemicals segment that is the subject of a transaction with Trichem. Just for added complexity, the prior period also includes the Fleet business that was disposed of to Nedbank.

Looking through all the noise here, the summary for me is that what’s left of enX is in a really difficult spot. They’ve disposed of the better businesses that were capable of finding buyers. The remaining stuff is going to be a bigger challenge.


Kore Potash could end up going private before the Kola Project is even built (JSE: KP2)

Unsurprisingly, buyers are circling the asset

Junior mining is all about getting through the big initial milestones and creating value through that process. It’s similar in nature to venture capital, with cash burn along the way in the early days in the hope of huge profits down the line. The ongoing need for capital is why many such companies choose to list and build in public, particularly on exchanges that are supportive of the mining sector (like the JSE).

But when the risk/reward profile shifts as milestones are achieved, these companies become more attractive takeover targets. Sure enough, Kore Potash has attracted the attention of investors who might be looking to do more than just put some money in towards the Kola Project’s development.

The company has engaged advisors to cast the net wide enough to see if an attractive deal can be found. If such a deal materialises, it’s likely that it would be for all the shares in the company and that a delisting would be on the table. There are two parties who have submitted non-binding expressions of interest in this regard.

There’s no guarantee whatsoever that anything will happen here. I must note that the company requires funding this month, so they are playing a risky game here in the pursuit of the best possible deal for shareholders and the company. The company has released a cautionary announcement to remind shareholders to be careful at the moment.

The current share price is more than 6x higher than the lows in May 2024. When junior mining goes well, it can go very well.


Pepkor has finalised the R1.7 billion Legit / Swagga / Style / Boardmans acquisition (JSE: PPH)

The group is looking to increase its market share in adultwear categories

Pepkor is doing very well at the moment, as evidenced by the recent results. This is because they have been focused on execution in South Africa for lower-income consumers who have come to rely on Pepkor’s offering and its associated credit business. Doing a few things really well is always a better idea than doing many things badly.

One of Pepkor’s traditional strengths lies in kidswear. They are looking to take the learnings and apply them to more adult-focused businesses, as this is obviously a huge opportunity. They have talked before about being underindexed in adultwear, a fancy way for a retailer to describe a situation in which they have lower relative market share in that category vs. other categories.

As part of this strategy, Pepkor announced in March this year that they had agreed to acquire Legit, Swagga, Style and Boardmans from Retailability, the company that had acquired Edgars out of business rescue. The update is that the final purchase price is R1.7 billion (roughly 1.7% of Pepkor’s market cap) and that the conditions for the deal have been met. The implementation date was 2 November 2025.

Boardmans is the odd one out here, being an online-only business in the homeware segment. That will slot into the Pepkor Lifestyle business. As for the rest, they will land in Pepkor Speciality to try and maximise the potential synergies. Pepkor will undoubtedly apply their “credit interoperability strategy” to these stores as well, with 469 stores being added to the existing footprint of 979 stores in Pepkor Speciality.


Nibbles:

  • Director dealings:
    • An associate of a director of South Ocean Holdings (JSE: SOH) bought shares worth R38k.
    • The CEO of Vunani (JSE: VUN) bought shares worth R9.6k.
  • Here’s an interesting one: the CFO of Attacq (JSE: ATT), Raj Nana, has resigned from the role with effect from the end of January 2026. He’s been with Attacq for around 12 years! There are no details in the announcement on where he is going or who his successor will be.
  • MTN Zakhele Futhi (JSE: MTNZF) announced that the special dividend of R4.20 per share has received SARB approval and will be paid on 17 November. This is part of the final winding up of the scheme after it realised its investment in MTN.
  • Visual International (JSE: VIS) raised just R1.7 million through its bookbuild process. Such is life in penny stock land, unfortunately. It would probably also help tremendously if they had a working website, but what do I know?

Ghost Bites (Altron | Ethos Capital | Exxaro | MTN Rwanda | Oceana | Pepkor | Redefine Properties | Santova)

Altron’s profits are higher, but be cautious of why (JSE: AEL)

A change to depreciation policy isn’t exactly a high quality source of growth

Altron has released results for the six months to August. At a quick glance they look incredible, with HEPS up 22% despite revenue dipping by 1%. As you dig deeper though, you’ll find that a change in depreciation policy at Netstar has been a major driver of that earnings uplift.

The best way to isolate this effect is to compare EBITDA from continuing operations (up 4%) to operating profit (up 15%). EBITDA is before depreciation, whereas operating profit is net of depreciation. Altron has successfully argued that Netstar’s depreciation curve of its underlying telematics devices should be less aggressive based on their useful lives. That may well be correct, but it does create an artificial once-off bump in the earnings growth rate. Next year, the new depreciation policy will be in the base year and the new financial year, so the year-on-year growth rates won’t be impacted by this change. This means that EBITDA growth of 4% this year is probably a better indication of maintainable growth than the 15% jump in operating profit.

The interim dividend is up 20%, so they’ve tried to get the dividend growth as close as possible to HEPS growth despite the non-cash nature of the change in depreciation. Sounds good, but the company clearly has space to do this when only paying out 48 cents vs. HEPS of 87 cents (including discontinued operations).

This isn’t to say that Altron doesn’t have a good news story to tell. For example, Netstar’s subscriber numbers grew 11% and the turnaround of the Australian business is expected to return it to profitability in the second half of the year and beyond. EBITDA growth at Netstar was 10%. In Altron FinTech, they achieved revenue growth of 24% and EBITDA growth of 18%, with SMEs attracted to the collections and payment platform. They are competing in the POS devices space there.

But there are areas of the business that are struggling for growth, which is why group revenue from continuing operations was down 1%. Altron Digital Business is the problem child, with the group referring to a “muted” IT investment environment that led to revenue in this area dropping by 10%. As we’ve seen in other listed companies like Bytes Technology (JSE: BYI), changes to OEM partner rebate structures are hurting these IT distribution businesses. The drop in revenue was severe enough to take EBITDA from a profit of R42 million to a loss of R32 million, leading to Altron implementing a plan to remove R150 million from its cost base. It’s hard to imagine how that can be achieved without jobs being impacted, so that’s very unfortunate.

In an effort to at least get some of the AI action at a time when other areas of IT are under pressure, Altron has launched an “AI Factory” with enterprise-level AI infrastructure and services. It will be interesting to see if that gets traction.

Although a small segment vs. the others, Altron HealthTech is worth a mention. Despite flat revenue, they grew EBITDA by 21%. This is because the mix shifted from project revenue towards annuity revenue, usually a good thing for platform businesses like these.

Here’s another example of strong profit growth despite tough revenue: Altron Document Solutions saw revenue drop by 5%, yet EBITDA was up by a meaty 53%. Printers and associated software and digital solutions can still make money!

On the distribution side of the business, Altron Arrow suffered a drop in revenue of 23% and EBITDA fell by 46%. The electronic component distribution industry is struggling.

As you can see, it’s a mixed bag. They might be doing well in Netstar (revenue of R1.2 billion), but that’s not enough to offset the worries in the larger Altron Digital Business segment (revenue of R1.5 billion). The market wasn’t blind to this, with the share price down 8.5% on the day.


It looks like Ethos Capital is entering its final stages as a listed company (JSE: EPE)

The Optasia (JSE: OPA) listing has led to a further value unlock opportunity

It’s been a long time coming for Ethos Capital, but it looks as though the company has a route to achieving a full value unlock for shareholders. They’ve been working on it since November 2023, which shows you how long it takes to achieve an orderly exit from a portfolio of assets. This is what drives the marketability discount that has become a justification in the market for investment holding companies to be valued at a 20% – 30% discount to NAV. You’ll see why that is relevant shortly.

The listing of Optasia on the JSE gives Ethos an opportunity to sell down its stake in Optasia from 6.5% to 4.5% and raise R370 million in the process. The listing has been achieved at a premium to the valuation that Ethos had on Optasia (more evidence that you should always be careful of IPO pricing), with the net asset value per share increasing from R8.57 to R9.39 thanks to the partial unlock of cash here.

But where does this leave the rest of the assets? The Brait Exchangeable Bonds are set to be unbundled to shareholders. This represents R0.74 per Ethos share. As for the rest of the assets, a “large South African financial institution” has put in a non-binding offer to acquire the residual assets at a 29% discount to their NAV. This brings me back to the point around the marketability discount, as the board of Ethos Capital views this offer favourably vs. the likely outcome of selling these assets piecemeal in the market. Once again, the NAV of investment holding companies is becoming an increasingly useless number based on market practice in South Africa.

Here’s where the maths gets interesting: once you take into account the cost saving of immediately selling the assets vs. maintaining a listed structure while selling them over time, Ethos reckons that the discount to NAV is 19%. Again, this is the argument for practicality vs. what the NAV could theoretically be realised at.

Assuming this becomes a binding offer (and there’s no guarantee of that), Ethos would then have the remaining Optasia stake as its only asset. They would look to sell that once the six-month lock up period expires.

With all said and done, these transactions would imply an adjusted NAV per share of R8.44, which is a 10.6% discount to the adjusted NAV after the initial Optasia sell-down. But importantly, this is a 14% premium to the Ethos share price before this announcement. This is why the share price closed 13% higher on the day at R8.25.

CEO Anthonie de Beer isn’t hanging around for this. He’s accepted a role elsewhere (the announcement doesn’t give details). Jonathan Matthews, a partner at Ethos Private Equity for 11 years, will step into the role to see this process through.


Exxaro has offloaded FerroAlloys (JSE: EXX)

The deal value is R250 million

Exxaro announced that it has disposed of FerroAlloys, its domestic producer of ferrosilicon for industrial customers in South Africa. The deal became effective on 31 October 2025. The buyer is a consortium led by EverSeed Metal Powders (60%), with FerroAlloys management holding 30% and the other 10% in an employee share ownership plan. EverSeed is a 100% Black-Owned group in the resources and energy sectors.

The “majority” of the price of R250 million (they don’t give the exact portion) is payable in cash. But there’s also a vendor loan here with deferred payments (i.e. Exxaro retains exposure) and what sounds like some equity in EverSeed as well. This is a category 2 transaction (due to its size), so Exxaro can get away with giving only vague indications here rather than deal specifics.


MTN Rwanda joins the party (JSE: MTN)

Here’s another African subsidiary doing really well

MTN Rwanda has released results for the nine months to September 2025. Just like we saw at MTN Nigeria, there’s a very positive story to tell.

For the nine months, service revenue is up by 14.2%, driven by underlying drivers like a 7.5% increase in active data subscribers and a 12.2% increase in Mobile Money (MoMo) users. This was good enough to drive EBITDA higher by 36.7%, taking EBITDA margin to 41.2% (up 720 basis points).

The percentages get even crazier further down the income statement, with profit after tax up 222.7%. Perhaps most impressively from a free cash flow perspective, this performance was complemented by capital expenditure excluding leases dropping by 27.1%. This is why adjusted free cash flow has more than doubled on a year-to-date basis.

In terms of cadence through the year, the latest quarter saw an acceleration in revenue (16.2% total revenue growth vs. 13.1% year-to-date), but EBITDA was up 27.7% vs. 36.7% year-to-date because of a tougher base. Importantly, EBITDA margin has increased in the third quarter vs. earlier this year. There was very little capex in the base period, so the year-on-year change in capex in Q3 is actually negative. Capex timing can vary across quarters.

Overall, it’s a very strong set of numbers. Rwanda’s GDP is forecast to grow by 7.1% in 2025 and inflation is in a healthy range of 2% to 8%, so MTN can do very well under these circumstances.


Some of Oceana’s year-on-year pain was mitigated by catch rates at the end of the period (JSE: OCE)

This just shows how hard it is to run a business around Mother Nature

Primary agriculture is a difficult industry at the best of times. When it takes place in the oceans, the volatility becomes even harder to manage. The only certainty you can really have when investing in a business like Oceana is uncertainty, as the business is constantly having to manage a number of risk factors.

This means that there will be good years and bad years. If you prefer a smooth journey, then it’s best to stick to the local dam and not venture out into the open ocean. The latest earnings guidance is a reminder of this, with Oceana tightening the range for the decrease in HEPS for the year ended September 2025. They now expect it to be a drop of between 36% and 42% vs. the prior year.

This is better than they previously expected though, with a trading update in mid-September noting an expectation of a drop of at least 40%. Those words “at least” tend to work hard in these situations, with the company leaving enough wriggle room to announce something much worse than a 40% drop. The reason for the relatively mild 36% to 42% guidance is that the catch rates in the wild caught seafood segment were “significantly better than anticipated” in the last two weeks of September.

For context, the interim period to March 2024 was a drop in HEPS of 43.9%, so the full year picture is remarkably consistent with the shape of the prior year’s earnings.


Pepkor’s business model is flying in this environment (JSE: PPH)

The focus on value offerings and a credit overlay is the right model

Pepkor released a strong trading update for the year ended September 2025. These numbers certainly do nothing to support the excuses at retailers that are putting out weak numbers at the moment, as Pepkor has shown what is possible.

A 12% increase in revenue is really strong, with Pepkor referring to its resilient and defensive model. Their clothing and general merchandise revenue was up 8.9% and fintech jumped by a delightful 31.1%. But here’s something else that is rather impressive: furniture, appliances and electronics revenue was up 7.2%. Remember the recent Nu-World (JSE: NWL) update that also reflected an increase in revenue in consumer discretionary goods? Perhaps the macroeconomic environment isn’t so bad after all, with some retailers just using it as a convenient excuse for weak performance.

Pepkor certainly doesn’t need any excuses or apologies to investors, with normalised HEPS from continuing operations up by between 18% and 28%. That’s the best indication of how the core business is performing – and it’s performing really well!

Full details will be available on 25 November.


Mid-single digit growth at Redefine Properties (JSE: RDF)

For investors seeking yield and real growth, this is what they want to see

Property funds are popular because they offer investors a more defensive underpin in a portfolio (in theory, at least) with a decent dividend yield and a high likelihood of real returns (growth in excess of inflation). The latest numbers from Redefine Properties are a good example of what the market wants to see in this space.

For the year ended August 2025, distributable income per share grew by 4.7% and the company took advantage of its stable position to hike the dividend per share by 7.8%. The SA REIT NAV per share increased by 3.6%, so the “value” of the fund is moving up in line with inflation. The loan-to-value ratio of 40.6% indicates that the balance sheet is sitting with a healthy mix of debt.

Looking ahead, distributable income per share growth for FY26 is anticipated to be between 4% and 6%. That’s not quite the same as the dividend per share, as the payout ratio is able to flex between 80% and 90% of distributable income per share. If you’re keen to understand more about the company, you can refer to their recent appearance on Unlock the Stock.


Santova paints a worrying picture (JSE: SNV)

A presentation to the market comes after weak results and extensive selling by directors in recent months

There was so much positivity around Santova when they announced the acquisition of Seabourne Group in May this year. Directors and execs were buying shares and the market responded positively. But as you can see, the share price is now back where it started:

“Performance is not as bad as it appears on face value” is one of the opening sentences in the presentation to the market. This certainly isn’t stopping one of the executive directors from selling shares. If you read further on, Santova claims that “almost all imports from South Africa and China have ceased” in relation to the United States. This is really hurting their US-based business in Los Angeles, where they have a highly onerous lease that only ends in 16 months from now. Sounds pretty bad to me!

If we look at the South African business, their revenue fell 3.4% and the company is worried about the impact of tariffs on South African goods. I find this very interesting, as recent reporting in the local agriculture sector has painted a far rosier picture of our export markets. That’s obviously just one sector, whereas Santova has more of an umbrella view on the South African economy, so keep that in mind.

The Asia Pacific region saw a drop in revenue of 22.4%, although the Australian growth of 7.1% is masking just how bad the drops were in Hong Kong (-33.6%) and Singapore (-36.8%). Santova has noted deepening economic regional integration as they seek new trade deals. These conditions are not good for Santova.

By now, you must be wondering in exactly what way performance isn’t as bad as it looks at face value! The UK business is an area where they are more bullish, although that isn’t saying much. The Seabourne acquisitions is driving a structural change to the shape of the income statement, as it is a completely different business model to the rest of Santova’s business. Surprisingly, the Eurozone is another region where Santova has found some growth.

Despite all this pain, Santova has noted that they are alert to acquisition opportunities in this environment. Fair enough, but when the last seven director dealings announcements were for sales of shares, it’s kinda hard for the market to hit the buy button. Santova closed 3.6% lower at R7.07.


Nibbles:

  • Director dealings:
    • As a reminder of what life is like at the top, Sean Summers received R56.6 million worth of Pick n Pay (JSE: PIK) shares based on the first milestone being achieved in the turnaround. This seems to mainly be based on getting leadership structures in place and achieving like-for-like sales growth. As a reminder, Pick n Pay’s supermarkets business (i.e. excluding Boxer) is still heavily loss-making.
    • A director of Santova (JSE: SNV) sold shares worth R2.9 million.
    • The CEO of Choppies (JSE: CHP) bought shares worth just over R900k.
    • The CEO of Vunani (JSE: VUN) bought shares worth R22k.
  • Could ISA Holdings (JSE: ISA) be among the next wave of delistings from the JSE? The technology company has released a cautionary announcement based on a non-binding expression of interest that would lead to an unnamed offeror acquiring a controlling stake via a scheme of arrangement and delisting the company. There’s absolutely no guarantee that the deal will go ahead. Nevertheless, the share price was up 12% by close of play in anticipation of a potentially juicy offer premium.
  • There’s a substantial change to HEPS at Labat Africa (JSE: LAB). Although it’s rare to see, there were significant accounting movements between the release of provisional results and audited final results. In this case, the change has led to HEPS coming in at 5.81 cents for the year ended May instead of 13.28 cents. That’s a huge difference for a stock trading at 7 cents per share! The change is due to the reversal of a bargain purchase gain and the allocation of the purchase price for Classic and Ahnamu to other lines on the financials. These acquisitions make the year-on-year comparisons pointless, so investors should rather see these numbers as the baseline going forwards. It’s just a pity that HEPS was so incorrect in the initial release.
  • Merafe (JSE: MRF) announced that the chrome ore marketing agreement with Glencore (JSE: GLN) has been extended to January 2026. The terms of the agreement are unchanged in terms of Glencore earning a commission from the joint venture in which Merafe has a 20.5% share and Glencore has a 79.5% share. In case you weren’t aware, Glencore also has a 29% shareholding in Merafe.
  • YeboYethu (JSE: YYLBEE) is enjoying the improvement in Vodacom’s (JSE: VOD) share price. A trading statement for the six months to September reflects an increase in NAV of between 75% and 85%, which puts it at an expected range of R84.36 to R89.18. The current share price is R39, so it’s trading at a substantial discount to NAV. The reason for the increase is that Vodacom’s share price jumped by nearly 22% between September 2024 and September 2025.
  • Metrofile (JSE: MFL) announced that potential acquirer Mango Holding Corp now has an 11.13% stake in the company through a total return swap arrangement with Standard Bank as the counterparty.
  • Putprop (JSE: PPR) is a property small cap with very little trade in its stock. I’m therefore just giving it a passing mention that the company has agreed to sell a portion of Summit Place in Menlyn for R26.5 million. The portion is actually the right of extension at the property, so this is a future development project rather than an income-earning asset. The property was valued at R30 million, so they’ve taken a knock here to get it off the balance sheet.
  • The situation at Shuka Minerals (JSE: SKA) is becoming very awkward, as I feared. When cash is supposed to flow and there are endless excuses about administrative issues, then something is wrong. The company is waiting for funding promised by Gathoni Muchai Investments (GMI) to facilitate the acquisition of Leopard Exploration and Mining. There’s $1.35 million in cash owed to the sellers. Despite promises that funds would flow last week, they didn’t. As we are now accustomed to, GMI has promised that the money will come this week. Separately, Shuka Minerals is in negotiations around the stockpile of fines at the Rukwa operation, which it believes could raise between $420k to $480k in sales revenue. They haven’t locked down a sale as of yet.

Ghost Bites (Collins Property | Impala Platinum | MC Mining | MTN Nigeria | Nu-World | Renergen | Vodacom)

Only modest dividend growth at Collins Property as they reinvest in the group (JSE: CPP)

The loan-to-value ratio is well above the levels that REITs usually run at

Collins Property Group has released results for the six months to August. Despite a juicy increase in distributable income per share from 54 cents to 63 cents, the dividend has only increased from 50 cents to 52 cents. Interesting.

The debt ratios give us a clue as to why the group might be taking a more conservative approach with dividends. The loan-to-value is high at 51.8%, with most REITs preferring to run in the low 40s. The group has been investing in the Netherlands, so they’ve run the balance sheet hot to make that transaction happen. There are properties worth R960 million that have been sold and are awaiting transfer, so perhaps that will give the balance sheet some breathing room going forwards. I’m not convinced they will reduce debt though, as the outlook statement speaks directly to deal flow and reinvestment opportunities.

As a quick look at the South African portfolio, the vacancy rate in both the industrial and retail portfolios is running at roughly 0.8%. The office portfolio is still really struggling, with a vacancy rate of 17.3%. The office portfolio is 7% of the group’s property exposure and they are looking to sell those properties.


Group production dipped at Impala Platinum, but sales are higher (JSE: IMP)

An increase in refined production helped here

Mining is a complicated thing. Even when the prevailing market prices for a commodity are favourable, the mining houses still need to get the stuff out of the ground and sell it. This is why production reports are very important.

For the three months to September, Impala Platinum experienced a 5% decline in group 6E production volumes. Despite this, refined and saleable production volumes increased by 3%, helping to drive a 7% increase in sales volumes. Based on this performance, FY26 guidance has been maintained.

There were various reasons for this, ranging from lower grades and recoveries through to the timing of maintenance. The key is that sales at least moved in the right direction, even if production had some challenges.


MC Mining is making progress at Makhado (JSE: MCZ)

Uitkomst remains a difficult story

MC Mining released an activities report for the quarter ended September. It’s positive overall, with the company making solid progress at the Makhado Project and achieving some key milestones. There have been some delays (as usual in large construction projects), but commissioning activities for the coal plant are expected to begin by December 2025.

At Uitkomst Colliery, the turnaround plan was approved and key initiatives are being executed. Run-of-mine production fell 8% year-on-year and 21% quarter-on-quarter, so they have a lot of work to do there. High-grade coal sales were down 1% year-on-year. Coal prices are still under pressure vs. the levels seen earlier this year, although revenue per tonne actually increased year-on-year.

Thankfully, the investment by Kinetic Development Group is supporting the balance sheet through this tricky period, with a cash balance of $13.2 million at the end of the period.

Although there was a 15.8% climb in the share price on the day, it happened before the announcement came out at 10am.


Incredible momentum at MTN Nigeria (JSE: MTN)

A far more stable macroeconomic base is doing wonders

MTN Nigeria is a perfect example of an extreme version of the risk/reward trade-off. It’s a huge market, which means the size of the prize is exciting. It unfortunately also comes with a heavy dose of macroeconomic volatility. After all, it was just last year that things almost looked hopeless for MTN Nigeria.

These issues are in the rearview mirror now, although one should never discount them from returning. The Nigerian naira has actually appreciated against the US dollar in 2025 (thanks, Trump and tariffs). The Central Bank of Nigeria has managed to decrease interest rates by 50 basis points (although the Monetary Policy Rate remains very high at 27%). There’s clearly a recovery underway.

This is doing wonderful things for MTN Nigeria’s business. Total revenue is up 57.4% for the nine months year-to-date and 62.8% for the quarter ended September, so there’s been an acceleration in the business. EBITDA is up by a delicious 123% year-to-date, with margin shooting up from 36.3% to 51.4%. In the third quarter, EBITDA was up 129.2% and the margin was 52.9%, so the acceleration is again evident.

Here’s the real kicker though: MTN Nigeria generated 45% of the year-to-date profit in the third quarter! The momentum throughout the year has been immense, with the business having swung sharply from losses to profits.

As the icing on the cake, free cash flow is up 38.5% year-to-date and 75.7% in the third quarter. The day truly was darkest before the dawn for them. The big question is: can it continue?


Nu-World paints a surprisingly positive picture of the South African consumer (JSE: NWL)

This small cap is always a useful look at local discretionary spending

It’s very unlikely that Nu-World is on your investment radar. With a market cap of R650 million and an average of R100k – R120k in stock changing hands each day, this isn’t exactly an institutional investor favourite, or a regular feature on stock picking lists. But there is one thing that Nu-World is particularly useful for: a clean look at consumer health in South Africa.

This is because Nu-World specialises in consumer discretionary goods, like appliances. They do have offshore markets, so an effort to isolate the South African performance requires a dig into the segmental numbers.

Let’s deal with the group performance first. For the year ended August, Nu-World’s revenue was up 11.1% and HEPS increased 11.0%. The dividend per share was up 9.4%. That’s a solid set of numbers.

In South Africa, revenue was up by 13.8% and income jumped by 60%, so they definitely didn’t need to cut their margins to achieve that sales uplift. TV and audio sales improved and seasonal categories did particularly well. Overall, despite the prevailing high interest rates, South African consumers increased their purchases of these discretionary items.


It’s not every day you’ll see a gross loss, but such is life at Renergen (JSE: REN)

The ASP Isotopes (JSE: ISO) offer truly saved the day

There are many companies that make a net loss from time to time – that’s a loss after covering all operating expenses, finance costs and the like. But it’s very rare to see a gross loss, which is the opposite of a gross profit – in other words, a situation where the company is losing money every time it sells something!

Renergen is no longer capitalising the costs related to the recent plant construction, as the plant has been commissioned. This means that the costs are landing on the income statement as an expense, rather than being sent to the balance sheet as an asset. What would usually happen is that the revenue flowing from the commissioning of the plant would offset the costs. Alas, Renergen managed to suffer a drop of 4% in LNG production and they produced negligible helium, so the revenue just wasn’t there.

After swinging from a gross profit of R0.9 million to a gross loss of R28.7 million, you can imagine what the rest of the income statement looks like. Other operating expenses jumped by R31.5 million, with only an incremental R3.2 million being due to professional fees related to the ASP Isotopes offer and Renergen’s legal battles. When you reach the funding costs line, you’ll find a leap of R50.2 million thanks to the funding costs on the loan from ASP Isotopes that arguably kept Renergen alive, as well as the Standard Bank facility.

Renergen currently has cash of R163.1 million and owes ASP Isotopes R538.5 million. I truly have no idea how Renergen shareholders would’ve survived without the offer coming in from ASP Isotopes.


Vodacom’s earnings are growing strongly (JSE: VOD)

This is the case even after adjusting for once-offs in the base

Vodacom released a trading statement for the six months to September 2025. HEPS growth of 40% to 45% looks ridiculous at first blush, but there are some adjustments to consider.

The corresponding period had once-off impacts related to the DRC and Ethiopia of 55 cents per share, so the adjusted base for HEPS would be 408 cents. Even then, the guided range of 494 cents to 512 cents is an uplift of roughly 23% at the midpoint!

Vodacom has noted that there are some other significant movements below the EBITDA line that are leading to this jump. EBITDA growth is expected to be in line with the 2030 growth plan, which means double-digit growth. It’s very likely that Egypt is a major contributor here.

Either way, it’s an impressive set of numbers. I look forward to the release of full details.


Nibbles:

  • Director dealings:
    • A director of a major subsidiary of OUTsurance (JSE: OUT) – specifically their Australian business – sold shares in OUTsurance worth R24.2 million.
    • Norbert Sasse, the CEO of Growthpoint (JSE: GRT), sold shares in the company worth R11.5 million.
    • A non-executive director of Valterra Platinum (JSE: VAL) sold shares worth R9.8 million.
    • A non-executive director of Old Mutual (JSE: OMU) bought shares worth almost R3 million. I’m really not sure why, but he also sold shares worth around R240k!
    • An associated entity and the spouse of a non-executive director of Northam Platinum (JSE: NPH) bought shares worth R2.2 million.
    • A director of Santova (JSE: SNV) sold shares worth R560k.
    • For whatever reason, a few directors and senior execs at Attacq (JSE: ATT) donated shares to associates and spouses.
  • Aspen (JSE: APN) announced that the material contractual dispute related to the mRNA customer (i.e. the one that broke the share price this year) has been settled in Aspen’s favour for around R500 million. The company’s market cap has shed roughly R30 billion in value this year, so that’s a very small consolation prize in the broader context.
  • Stefanutti Stocks (JSE: SSK) has made important progress with the balance sheet. The primary operating subsidiary has concluded a new R850 million 5-year facility agreement with Standard Bank. The facility has been priced at three-month JIBAR plus a margin of 3.5%. The key here is that the facility will be used to settle the current loan obligations with lenders that was extended to June 2026. Stefanutti Stocks intends to settle the capital on this loan using the contractual claim re: Kusile and the proceeds from the sale of SS-
    Construções (Moçambique) Limitada.
  • Unsurprisingly, Curro (JSE: COH) received almost unanimous approval for the scheme of arrangement related to the Jannie Mouton Stigting transaction. I genuinely cannot understand why anyone would vote against it. Perhaps the 0.02% of votes against the scheme were just finger trouble?
  • Kore Potash (JSE: KP2) released its quarterly update for the three months to September. After term sheets were signed for the financing of the project in early June, the focus in the past few months has been on putting the right people in place for the project. This includes project management services, with a bid from United Mining Services winning the request for proposal process. Contracts are expected to be executed by the end of 2025. Other workstreams include the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment, as well as the analysis of samples from the cores that were shipped to China. The company had $2.13 million in cash as at the end of September.
  • Spear REIT (JSE: SEA) has completed the acquisition of Maynard Mall for R455 million. The loan-to-value ratio is between 18% and 19% after this acquisition.
  • KAP (JSE: KAP) has announced its new CFO to replace Frans Olivier who has stepped into the top job as CEO. Dries Ferreira is coming in as the new CFO, which means he is leaving his CFO role at Astral Foods (JSE: ARL). KAP quite honestly needs all the help it can get, so someone with poultry sector experience (one of the toughest sectors around) feels like a solid choice to me. Astral hasn’t announced a successor as they were obviously caught off-guard by the resignation.
  • While on the topic of new CFOs, DRDGOLD (JSE: DRD) confirmed that CFO Designate Henriette Hooijer (whose appointment was announced in June) will replace Riaan Davel with effect from 1 February 2026.
  • Cilo Cybin (JSE: CCC) announced that the trades caused by errors in a broker’s system have been rectified, including the trades related to the CEO and a non-executive director.
  • Europa Metals (JSE: EUZ) has been suspended from trading on the AIM since May 2025. The last major announcement from the company was that it is working towards returning assets to shareholders in the most tax efficient way. With an asset base that consists mainly of cash and shares in Denarius Metals Corp, the group has net assets of AUD3.24 million (around R36.7 million). Not that there’s much trade in the shares on the JSE, but the most recent share price suggests a current market cap of just below R30 million (and thus not far off the NAV per share).
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