Bidvest’s disposal of Bidvest Bank has fallen through (JSE: BVT)
The Bidvest Life disposal is still in progress though (with a different counterparty)
Corporate deals are difficult things. Even when you think there’s a great deal on the table, it’s very possible that it will fall through before the conditions precedent are fulfilled.
A deal isn’t a deal until money is in the bank and all conditions have been met. That’s the golden rule. Until then, it’s just a strong promise at best and a vague idea at worst.
Sadly, Bidvest is just the latest example of this. The deal to dispose of 100% of Bidvest Bank to Access Bank has fallen through. Certain conditions were not fulfilled by Access Bank in time.
Bidvest must now go back to the drawing board in terms of this disposal, with a relaunch of the process and an invitation to new buyers. Bank acquirers don’t tend to fall out of the sky on a daily basis, so the jury is out on how long this might take. Bidvest will need to keep the bank capitalised and financially sound during this period.
At least the Bidvest Life disposal is still in play, with the buyer being a private equity-led consortium. The parties are working towards the achievement of key conditions precedent.
So, if you would like to own a bank, Bidvest is waiting for your call.
DRDGOLD joins the cool kids club as earnings approximately double (JSE: DRD)
It could’ve been so much more if production went the right way
DRDGOLD is an example of a mining house with a share price trajectory that was saved by the higher gold price, not just boosted by it. They’ve been struggling with production numbers, as the tailings facilities have been dealing with challenges like a decreasing gold yield due to depletion of higher-grade material.
In a trading statement for the six months to December 2025, DRDGOLD achieved HEPS growth of between 93% and 103%. That sounds fantastic obviously, but the underlying trend is worrying: revenue was up only 33% despite the gold price increasing 43%. The balancing number is an unfortunate 7% decrease in gold sold.
At Far West Gold Recoveries, the gold yield fell by a significant 10% as they had to process from a lower-grade area. At least throughput tonnages were consistent there, albeit of lower quality. At Ergo Mining, the gold yield fell by 4% and throughput tonnages fell by 5% due to weather-related interruptions.
Cash operating costs per kilogram increased by 13%. Group cash operating costs were up 4% overall, but remember that production was down and hence the per-unit number is unpleasant. There are some highlights here, like electricity costs decreasing at Ergo thanks to the solar plant and battery energy storage system. They managed to avoid a 12.74% increase in the Eskom tariff, so I expect that the return on investment for that renewable energy system looks good.
For the year ending June 2026, the company is trending towards the higher end of production guidance of 140,000 to 150,000 ounces (vs. 155,288 ounces in FY25). Unit costs are expected to remain within guidance.
With difficult metrics at the existing facilities, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that there’s a substantial capex bill to try and improve things. Capital reinvestment increased by 74% to R1.65 billion. They are working on Ergo’s Daggafontein TSF and Far West Gold Recoveries’ DP2 Plant expansion. Notably, the transfer of the Kloof 2 dump from majority shareholder Sibanye-Stillwater (JSE: SSW) to DRDGOLD has increased the mineral resource at Far West Gold Recoveries.
As at 31 December 2025, DRDGOLD had R1.73 billion in cash and remained free of any bank debt. They do have debt facilities in place in case they need them.
Hyprop reduces its exposure in Gauteng (JSE: HYP)
They are selling a 50% stake in Woodlands Boulevard
Hot on the heels of sector peer Growthpoint (JSE: GRT) reducing exposure to Sandton through the deal with Discovery (JSE: DSY), we now have Hyprop selling a 50% stake in Woodlands Boulevard, a retail property in Pretoria East.
The parties have prior experience with one another, with the buyers having acquired Atterbury Value Mart from Hyprop in 2021. This is important, as Hyprop is retaining the other 50% stake in the property and has no intention of selling it. They therefore need to be comfortable with getting into bed with these purchasers.
The price for the 50% stake is R790.5 million. Hyprop was carrying the property at a value of R1.747 billion (for the 100% stake) as at June 2025. Half of that number is R873 million, so they are selling this 50% stake at a discount of 9.5%. You won’t find the word “discount” anywhere in the announcement, so you have to work that out yourself to see this issue. One of the reasons for the difference might be the control premium attributable to a 100% stake vs. 50% co-ownership. But either way, it’s a disposal below book value.
Hyprop has had to provide rental guarantees to achieve that price. They’ve indemnified the purchasers against negative rent reversions and unbudgeted vacancies for two years from transfer date. Hyprop’s liability in this regard is capped at R10 million for the first 12 months and R10.6 million for the second 12 months. Along with the capped downside, Hyprop has negotiated uncapped upside – the property fund will receive any rent collected which exceeds the budgeted rent during the rent guarantee period.
Going forward, the asset management of the property will be performed jointly by Hyprop and the purchasers. The property management with onsite staff will be handled by a company related to one of the purchasers.
The Hyprop share price has had an exceptional year, up 42% over 12 months.
Metair is scrambling in a difficult environment (JSE: MTA)
This company has walked a very tough road
If Metair didn’t have bad luck, they wouldn’t have any luck at all. It’s amazing just how many things have gone wrong for them, ranging from local automotive production disasters at their customers’ plants through to huge fines from European regulators.
They still can’t catch a break, with the local OEM manufacturers reeling under the pressure of the Chinese onslaught. Metair references NAAMSA stats here: South African new car sales grew 15.7% in 2025, imported vehicles were up 30.4% and local production was up just 1.5%. Exports grew 4.4%, which suggests that local sales for OEMs were in the red.
This is why Metair has been trying to diversify through acquisitions like AutoZone, a clear step into the aftermarket sector. They acquired AutoZone out of business rescue – and companies don’t end up in that situation for no reason. They are running approximately six months behind the plan that underpinned the deal, so they need to get it back on track and quickly.
Metair is having such difficulties in the core business that they certainly can’t afford any troubles elsewhere. They’ve taken steps like closing the Industrial division of First Battery (inverters – no longer a good business at all) and Dynamic Batteries in the UK.
Despite all the challenges faced by Hesto as the subsidiary that supplies the local OEMs, that business still achieved higher revenue and better operating profit. Be careful of the base effect here, as 2024 was impacted by an engine certification issue at a major customer and an associated drop in volumes.
Let’s also not forget that Rombat, Metair’s battery manufacturer in Europe, was given a fine of around R413 million (at current exchange rates). The group is obviously considering all legal options, but it’s unlikely that they will avoid that disaster.
In terms of the financial performance, the inclusion of Hesto as a subsidiary has positively skewed the numbers, while AutoZone has given them a negative skew. Group revenue is up by between 53% and 58%, while group EBIT margin improved from 4.8% to between 6.0% and 6.2%.
The better view is to look at the segmentals, where Metair gives disclosure that adjusts for the subsidiaries. If Hesto had been accounted in the same way in both periods, OEM revenue would’ve been up by between 4% and 6%, while EBIT margins would’ve increased from 5.2% to 7.5% and 8.0%. I still wouldn’t extrapolate this growth due to the base effect of the engine certification issue.
The AFM segment (aftermarket) doesn’t have any disclosure on an ex-AutoZone basis. They note that AutoZone made an EBIT loss in this period, so that’s the main reason for the segmental EBIT margin dropping from 6.2% to between 3.9% and 4.1%.
Metair remains a high-risk story with plenty of debt, so it’s very important that they met all their covenants during the year (and continue to meet them). There’s no room for error in the debt package, with the banks holding the keys to the business at the moment.
If you include the Rombat fine, the headline loss per share for the 12 months to December 2025 is between -18 and -24 cents. If you exclude it, HEPS is between 185 and 195 cents. HEPS in 2024 was 105 cents.
Northam Platinum took full advantage of PGM prices (JSE: NPH)
Get ready for a massive increase in interim earnings
Northam Platinum certainly did their part in making sure that the six months to December 2025 was a period to remember for investors. Total metal sold increased by a substantial 13.7%. When you combine this with a 53.1% increase in the rand basket price, you get revenue growth of 60% for the period.
And as you’ve probably guessed, a fantastic jump in revenue like that can only mean even better things for profits. Still, I’m not sure you’re ready for just how crazy it gets when there are extensive fixed costs in a structure (like in mining).
The cost per 4E ounce increased by just 7.2% in the period, so operating profit increased by an incredible 439.2% to R5.8 billion. Yes, that’s more than a 5x increase. Welcome to the world of operating leverage!
We haven’t dealt with the next layer of leverage in the system yet. Northam Platinum has debt, so there’s a financial leverage effect between operating profit and HEPS. The percentage move isn’t important anymore when earnings are nearly 25x higher, coming in at between R15.185 and R15.295 per share vs. just 61.1 cents in the comparable period. Incredible.
I’ll finish with a more sobering comment: operating margin in the base period was just 7.5%, representing a time when the PGM miners were in serious trouble. In this period, the operating margin was 25.1%. Sure, we now find ourselves in a place where Northam can reverse most of the previous impairments to the Eland mine, but I’m not sure we are experiencing the super profits that the gold miners are enjoying. Things have merely improved to a level that looks more sustainable, with the year-on-year move reflecting the terrible base period.
But will things stay this way?
The share price is up by just over 200% in the past 12 months. If you annualise this interim earnings performance, you’re sitting on a forward Price/Earnings multiple of around 11.9x. It’s practically a guarantee that the full year numbers won’t be double the interim numbers, as there’s just so much volatility in this sector, but it’s still a good indication of how bullish the market is feeling.
Investors are now paying up for PGMs even though history has taught us to be careful in this sector.
Orion has locked in the prepayment deal with Glencore (JSE: ORN | JSE: GLN)
This will unlock $250 million in funding
Orion Minerals has some great news to share: they’ve signed a binding prepayment agreement with Glencore for a $250 million prepayment facility. This relates to bulk, copper and zinc concentrates from the Prieska Copper Zinc Project.
The funding will be sufficient for the Uppers development ($40 million) and part of the Deeps development (the remaining $210 million). Don’t you just love it when projects do what they say on the tin?
There’s potential for an early drawdown of $50 million for the Deeps project based on certain conditions being fulfilled.
First production from the Uppers is expected 13 months after close of the facility i.e. by the end of Q1 2027.
Losses get even worse at Pick n Pay (JSE: PIK)
The noose is getting tighter around their necks
Pick n Pay released a trading update for the 48 weeks to 1 February 2026. They’ve also included a trading statement for the 52 weeks to 1 March 2026. In the context of what we saw recently from Shoprite (JSE: SHP) and Woolworths (JSE: WHL), not to mention Pick n Pay’s own subsidiary Boxer (JSE: BOX), I’m afraid it’s not great.
For the 48 weeks, Pick n Pay South Africa’s like-for-like sales grew 2.9%. Company-owned supermarkets were up 3.5% (by far the “highlight”) and franchise stores were up just 1.5%. Total sales fell 1.4% as the group has been trying to shrink into prosperity, a very difficult strategy in retail. They note that the closures and conversions are “largely complete” – for now, at least. They will need to perform well to avoid another round of this pain.
Here’s the real surprise: Pick n Pay SA’s internal selling price inflation was 2.7%. I know this is a different period to peers, but that feels too high relative to recent numbers we saw at Shoprite group. This is the challenge of a drop in volumes as the footprint shrinks – you just can’t get the same deals from suppliers.
Online turnover increased by 31.8%, a solid outcome thanks to ASAP! and the groceries on the Mr D app.
Clothing is now a worry, with a year-on-year drop in turnover and like-for-like sales in the last 22 weeks of the period. Pick n Pay’s Clothing segment has more of a value focus, so this isn’t an acceptable outcome in the context of what we’ve seen at Pepkor (JSE: PPH) and Mr Price (JSE: MRP). They try to soften it by pointing out how well the business has been doing until this point, but you’re only as good as your latest numbers when you’re in turnaround mode unfortunately. The latest number is a 6.8% decline in like-for-like sales in standalone Pick n Pay Clothing stores in the 22 weeks to 1 February – yikes.
My worry remains that they are trying to pin this on macro factors. I quote: “The performance over the latter 22 weeks of the Period was below expectation and the result of a highly constrained market, particularly over the extended Black Friday period.”
No. The performance is because the business is still struggling after years of poor decisions, with Shoprite applying more and more pressure each year. I will never understand why management teams hope that blaming external factors will somehow distract investors from the problems. It isn’t working, with the market valuing Pick n Pay at less than zero if you apply the look-through value in Boxer, or roughly zero if you put a reasonable marketability discount on Boxer.
The headline loss per share is expected to increase in FY26 by more than 20%. This remains a turnaround that I’m staying far away from. But, I’m keen to hear your view, so please participate in the poll below:
The RMB Holdings board is supporting an offer by Attbid for all the shares in issue (JSE: RMH)
There was no shortage of debate on X around this one
Towards the end of last year, I wrote about how RMB is a good example of why you don’t want to be on the weaker end of the negotiating table. The company is sitting with a minority stake of 38.5% in a difficult property portfolio (the Atterbury portfolio), with the majority holders in that portfolio doing everything possible to make themselves the only buyers in town for that stake. When buyers are thin on the ground, prices suffer.
After much argy-bargy on this one, it became clear that the controlling shareholders in Atterbury were looking at acquiring RMH. If they can get control of RMH, then any remaining minority shareholders in RMH are coming along for the ride in a structure that is clearly controlled by Atterbury throughout.
I personally wouldn’t want to be a minority shareholder in a company that in turn is only a minority shareholder in its main asset. You may as well go ride rollercoasters all day, as you’ll have a similar amount of influence on the outcome of each ride as you’ll have on this investment.
The opportunity for Atterbury started with the acquisition of Coronation’s 28.35% stake in RMH in October 2025. It certainly wasn’t harmed by RMH then impairing the stake in the Atterbury portfolio, something that cynics say was to pave the way for this offer. I would point out that most recent offers on the market for investment holding companies have been at a discount of over 20% to NAV (net asset value) per share, so I didn’t think that the impairment for a marketability discount was unfair.
With the release of a firm intention announcement, the RMB Holdings board is supporting the general offer by AttBid for the shares. This isn’t a scheme of arrangement, although they would probably invoke squeeze-out provisions if they achieve sufficient acceptances.
The offer price is 47 cents per share, slightly below the NAV per share of 48.6 cents. I know I’m going to irritate people by pointing this out, but an offer at a small discount to NAV after an impairment isn’t any different to an offer at a steep discount to NAV before impairments. The price of 47 cents per share either is or isn’t a fair offer, regardless of the latest NAV estimate.
Here’s an interesting nuance: AttBid isn’t the same entity as Atterbury Property Fund. You see, AttBid is a consortium that includes Atterbury Property Fund and the brothers who founded WeBuyCars (JSE: WBC), Faan and Dirk van der Walt. They recently sold a huge chunk of WeBuyCars shares and raised eyebrows in the market. It seems as though their plan is to recycle that capital into this transaction and diversify their exposure. AttBid is held 49% by Atterbury Property Fund and 25.5% by each of the brothers.
The circular is expected to be released on 9 March. I expect to see plenty of arguments around this one along the way.
Vukile Property Fund’s commuter centres are doing extremely well (JSE: VKE)
To drive footfall, you must go where the people are
While premium shopping centres struggle with footfall at the moment due to increasing online adoption by consumers, centres with more of a value and commuter focus are doing really well. This is logical – you are catching people on their way to or from work, giving them an opportunity to quickly buy a few things that might otherwise have been bought from minimarts or even spaza stores (depending on which area).
Vukile Property Fund’s South African retail portfolio is focused on the areas of the market that offer strong growth prospects. In November and December 2025, their Commuter centres achieved an 11.1% increase in trading density, while Value centres were good for 8%. Township and Rural increased 3.7% and 2.7% respectively. Urban centres increased 3.7%.
In case you ever wondered why shopping centres have taxi ranks, now you know!
In terms of retail categories, there were some standout double-digit performances over the two months: women’s wear and footwear +12.7%, and fast food +12.5%. Special mention to cellphones (+9.9%), electronics (+8.7%) and gyms, health and beauty (+7.9%).
In terms of the Black Friday vs. festive split, November sales grew 2.4% off a high base (10% growth in November 2024) and December trading density increased by 4.5%. I’m not sure why they use slightly different metrics across the two months. Footfall was flat in November 2025 and up 3% year-on-year in December 2025. Commuter centres were again the pick of the litter, with footfall up 10.4%.
Moving abroad to the Castellana Properties portfolio and starting with Spain, turnover was up 7.3% in November and 3.2% in December. Segments like fashion and health and beauty led the way. Footfall fell 0.9% in November, although it increased 8.6% in Black Friday week and 13.1% on Black Friday itself. Bonaire is still recovering from the flooding, so that has impacted these numbers. If you exclude Bonaire, the Spanish portfolio’s footfall was up 4% in November.
In Portugal, November sales grew 9.5% and December sales were up just 1.5%. For whatever reason, Sports and Adventure was the standout category with 18.6% growth in November. Footfall increased 5.3% in November, although Black Friday itself was actually down 1.8%. In December, footfall fell by 0.4%, dragged down by the only asset in Portugal that isn’t managed by Vukile.
It seems like a good update overall, with the South African commuter properties offering the most exciting opportunity.
Nibbles:
- Vodacom (JSE: VOD) continues to invest in the Egyptian growth story. They’ve secured spectrum under the FY26 to FY32 programme with a present value of around $350 million. They must pay an instalment of $100 million in this financial year, with the balance of the liability due in three annual instalments. The next phase of the programme is coming in FY28, so that will in all likelihood result in additional investment.
- Powerfleet (JSE: PWR) released their earnings for the quarter ended December 2025. Volumes are extremely thin in this name, so I’m just mentioning it down here. Revenue came in at $113.5 million, up 7% year-on-year. Importantly, this is the first quarter where you can actually use the year-on-year numbers, as the acquired businesses are in the base. Income from operations was $6.3 million vs. an operating loss of $1.2 million in the comparable quarter. There was still a net loss per share, but that doesn’t stop Powerfleet reporting growth in adjusted EBITDA of 26% year-on-year. If there’s one thing tech companies love, it’s adjusted EBITDA!
- Africa Bitcoin Corporation (JSE: BAC) announced that Altvest Credit Opportunities Fund (ACOF) – by far the best part of the group in my opinion – raised R100 million in new debt funding under the R5 billion Domestic Medium Term Note Programme. I know I sound like a stuck record, but I still wish the group would just focus on delivering the ACOF opportunity. The timing of the group rebrand to focus on bitcoin has been most unfortunate in the context of the bitcoin price, but that’s the risk you take when you hitch your trailer to a volatile vehicle.
- Keen to get up to speed on Southern Palladium (JSE: SDL)? The group has been busy presenting at mining conferences, with the latest example being the 1-2-1 Mining Investment Conference in Cape Town. You can find it here.
- Alexander Forbes (JSE: AFH) has released a circular related to share-based payments and a desire to issue approximately 5% of total shares in issue to share scheme participants from 2026 to 2028. If you’re a shareholder here, perhaps take a look at the circular.
